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Legal Claims as Private Property:
Implications for Eminent Domain
by JEREMY A. BLUMENTHAL*
Introduction
A lawsuit is property. A plaintiff has a private property right in his
claim of action-i.e., in the right to sue-and in his lawsuit once filed. The
United States Constitution, as well as those of the several states,
specifically protects private property rights;' accordingly, a claim of action
in some instances warrants constitutional protection from interference by
state or federal government.
In a sense, this is a controversial proposition. Historically, claims of
action, choses in action, rights of suit, and lawsuits themselves have been
treated as personal and inalienable; indeed, three doctrines developed since
* Jeremy A. Blumenthal. J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School; A.B., A.M.,
Ph.D., Harvard University. For offering comments and pointers that improved the article (or
would have improved it had I listened), thanks to Jane Baron, Ben Barros, Marc Beckman, Judy
Bernstein, Eric Claeys, Nestor Davidson, David Driesen, Rachel Godsil, Laura Lape, Robin Paul
Malloy, and William Wiecek. Terry Turnipseed in particular repeatedly gave valuable feedback.
Thanks to participants in faculty workshops at Comell Law School and the Syracuse University
College of Law, and in the Property Works in Progress Conference at the University of Colorado
School of Law. Staff at the Cornell Law Library provided valuable research assistance; early
research by Julia Joyce was also helpful.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be ... deprived of ... property, without due
process of law"); id. ("nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation"); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 ("nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law"). Similarly, every state except North Carolina
has a takings clause. See DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 2
(Foundation Press 2002).
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the time of Greek and Roman law to prohibit the transfer or sharing of
lawsuits.2
Nevertheless, causes of action are increasingly being seen as alienable
and, in various contexts, as forms of property.3 Recent scholarship has
discussed the alienability of legal claims and the wisdom or viability of
creating markets for them. Syndication of lawsuits has increased and in
some cases has withstood legal challenge. Long-standing prohibitive
doctrines have been scaled back or abolished. And for some constitutional
purposes, courts have explicitly acknowledged individuals' property rights
in the right to sue. But some constitutional implications of these moves
have been under explored. Specifically, to the extent that legal claims are
seen as private property, the constitutional protection of both the Due
Process and the Takings Clauses are implicated. May the government
eliminate your right to sue? If so, what sort of due process rights must be
afforded?
Less examined than the due process concerns, and likely more
controversial, are concerns arising under the Takings Clause.4 May the
government in fact take your right to sue or your lawsuit and exercise it-
or take your right to sue or your lawsuit and deliberately not exercise it?
Even more controversial, may the government condemn your legal claim
and, consistent with its broad eminent domain powers as delineated in
Kelo, transfer that claim to another private party to pursue (or not)? In this
Article, I explore these questions, examining the Takings Clause implications
of considering the right to sue as private property.
I proceed in three parts. First, I address whether a legal claim may in
fact be considered private property. Without such a showing, of course,
constitutional protection of private property rights is not implicated, and
2. E.g., Isaac Marcushamer, Note, Selling Your Torts: Creating a Market for Tort Claims
and Liability, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1543, 1550-51 & nn.33 35 (2005) (identifying and defining
doctrines of champerty, maintenance, and barratry); Max Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24
CAL. L. REV. 48 (1936) (tracing historical development of the three doctrines). Despite some
ambiguity about their scope, the doctrines have generally been applied to bar the transfer or
division of lawsuits.
3. See cases cited intra note 44; State ex rel. Coffey v. Dist. Court, 240 P. 667, 669 (Mont.
1925) (noting that holder of a chose in action was "anciently" barred from transferring it, but
noting that in modem law, choses in action are assignable and constitute "property of some
character"); see also id. (reviewing similar case law from other jurisdictions, including
Connecticut, Alabama, Massachusetts, Indiana, and Maryland).
4. See, e.g., Olivia A. Radin, Note, Rights as Property, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1319-
20 (2004) (noting the rarity of the Takings Clause analysis and therefore focusing her discussion
of rights as property on the due process context, rather than the takings context).
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this Article would be very short indeed.5 Both as a matter of theory and
practice, however, I suggest that viewing legal claims in this way is
appropriate, and that they are thus subject to the exercise of eminent
domain by the government.
Two limitations are placed on the government's eminent domain
power, however. Private property may only be taken "for public use" and
if "just compensation" is given to the private property owner.6 Thus, in the
second part, I address what sort of purposes-some benign and even
laudable, some more unsavory-the government might have in
condemning an individual's right to sue another party. This part also
addresses issues of what it means for such property to be "taken" within the
meaning of the Clause. In the third part, I explore how just compensation
might be determined. Doing so is somewhat challenging, particularly
because of the indeterminate likelihood of a lawsuit's success. It is also a
challenge, however, because of a lack of clarity regarding exactly how a
lawsuit should be categorized in terms of value. That is, there is ambiguity
as to whether the procedural or the substantive right is what is valued, and
whether it is valued as an asset or as an option. Throughout, I note policy
implications of taking this view of legal claims.
I should make three points explicit. First, the paper is primarily
exploratory. Starting from the perspective that legal claims are "property"
for Takings Clause purposes, I bring together somewhat disparate doctrinal
threads and explore the picture that emerges. Spinning out the logical
implications both positive and negative of this perspective and these
doctrines raises questions of law and policy that warrant further discussion.
Second, I focus only on the eminent domain analysis, where there is a
naked transfer of ownership, title, or control of a lawsuit from a private
claim holder to the government or to another private party. This is quite
different from the context in which the nexus between takings and causes
5. C. CHARLES DICKENS, OLIVER TWiST I (Dodd, Mead & Co. 1941) (1838) ("For a long
time after it was ushered into this world of sorrow and trouble, by the parish surgeon, it remained
a matter of considerable doubt whether the child would survive to bear any name at all, in which
case it is somewhat more than probable that these memoirs would never have appeared; or, if they
had, that being comprised within a couple of pages, they would have possessed the inestimable
merit of being the most concise and faithful specimen of biography extant in the literature of any
age or country.").
6. Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 231-32 (2003) ("[T]he Fifth
Amendment imposes two conditions on the exercise of such authority: the taking must be for a
'public use' and 'just compensation' must be paid to the owner."); see also First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S 304, 314 (1987)
(noting that Takings Clause does not prohibit government takings, merely places limits on the
government's power to do so); Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of
Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985) ("The Fifth Amendment does not proscribe the taking of
property; it proscribes taking without just compensation.").
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of action has been discussed (on the few occasions it has been). That is, the
typical discussion is in the regulatory takings context, where some statute
or regulation diminishes or eliminates the value of, or the ability to use or
control, a lawsuit. Thus, I distinguish a substantial proportion of the
possible takings of legal claims-for instance, legislation that curtails or
abrogates a potential claim or defense, or procedural rules such as statutes
of limitations of rules of evidence. I do so for two reasons: First, this
different focus encourages discussion of the previously neglected
possibility that a government body might take ownership of an individual's
right to sue-rather than simply the possibility that government regulatory
action might influence the management or viability of an individual's suit;
second, the focus comports with the U.S. Supreme Court's emphasis on
distinguishing eminent domain and regulatory takings analyses. 7 The third
point to make explicit is that my focus on the Takings Clause subordinates
consideration of the due process analysis. As sketched below, although
that analysis is also comparatively rare, it is more common even than the
regulatory takings approach, and has been addressed before.8 Moreover,
similar to the regulatory takings distinction made above, making the due
process/takings distinction emphasizes that the Article's purview is not the
due process deprivation or withholding of a property right, but the actual
taking away of that right from an individual by the sovereign, whether for
its use or use by a third party.
I. Legal Claims are Constitutional Property
In evaluating whether a legal claim is a form of property for
constitutional purposes, one might begin with apparently straightforward
judicial statements. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has "squarely" held
that even an unadjudicated cause of action is constitutional property. 9 In
fact, in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., the Court considered that
7. E.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
323 (2002) ("This longstanding distinction between acquisitions of property for public use, on the
one hand, and regulations prohibiting private uses, on the other, makes it inappropriate to treat
cases involving physical takings as controlling precedents for the evaluation of a claim that there
has been a 'regulatory taking,' and vice versa."); Brovn, 538 U.S. at 233 (distinguishing sharply
between physical and regulatory takings); cf Eduardo Moises Pefialver, Is Land Special?: The
Unjustified Preference for Landownership in Regulatory Takings Law, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 227,
231 (2004) (distinguishing between confiscatory action, even of intangible property, and
regulatory action).
8. See Radin, supra note 4 (discussing due process analysis); see also infra notes 9 22.
9. Thomas Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 913 (2000).
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proposition "settled,"10 basing its assertion on Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co." 1 In Mullane, the Court had held that a proceeding by
the Bank for a judicial settlement of its accounts was in part
unconstitutional, because of the potential to limit beneficiaries' property
rights. This might occur in two ways, either by limiting beneficiaries'
rights to have the trustee Bank answer for impairing their interests, or by
using resources to compensate "one who, in their names but without their
knowledge, may conduct a fruitless or uncompensatory contest."' 12 Logan
further noted that a "tort or discrimination action" is "a property interest.,
1 3
And elsewhere the Court seemed to have "little doubt" that an unsecured
claim-specifically, a cause of action against a decedent's estate-was a
property interest, 14 as was a claim under state tort law. 15 Such statements
seem clear enough.
Relying on the seeming clarity of these statements, however, would be
disingenuous. These cases concerned due process protection, rather than
Takings Clause protection, and as such reflect a due process approach to
defining property. 16 Indeed, in each case in which the intangible right to
sue was framed as a property interest, the Court limited its definition to the
due process context.17 Of course, the constitutional text in both the Due
Process and Takings Clauses simply refer to "property." As such, the two
categories of constitutional protection might be considered co-extensive,
and precedent and reasoning from one line of cases might be applied to the
other. 8  In practice, however, this has usually not been the case.
10. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982) (considering it "settled" that
a cause of action is a species of property").
11. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
12. Id. at 313.
13. Logan, 455 U.S. at 430 n.5.
14. Tulsa Profl Collection Servs. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 485 (1988).
15. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 281-82 (1980) (state tort claim is, "[a]rguably," a
form of property).
16. See Logan, 455 U.S. 422; Mullane, 339 U.S. 306.
17. E.g., Martinez, 444 U.S. at 281-82 (stating that tort claim is property "protected by the
Due Process Clause"); Logan, 455 U.S. at 428 ("[A] cause of action is a species of property
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause."); see also Tulsa Prof'l
Collection Servs., 485 U.S. at 485 ("[A] cause of action .. . is property protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment."). Some cases do inappropriately conflate the two analyses, for instance
by applying the definition of property from due process cases to takings claims. See, e.g., cases
discussed infra Section I(C).
18. See LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 459 n. 11 (Foundation Press
2d. ed. 1988) (1978) (noting a "broader definition of property interests now employed in the law
of procedural due process" and suggesting that there is "no good reason" not to apply that broader
definition in the takings context); Stephen J. Massey, Comment, Justice Rehnquist s Theory of
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Commentators have recognized that at least since Flemming v. Nestor in
1960,19 the scope of constitutional property protection is different for the
Due Process and Takings Clauses, with due process protection typically
considered broader.20 Most recently, the Court in Lingle v. Chevron, U.S.A.
carefully distinguished the due process and takings approaches, indicating
that a due process test has "no proper place" in takings jurisprudence. 21 As
such, something more is needed than facile quotations.
22
That something more exists. Both as a theoretical and a positive
matter, legal claims should be considered property for Takings Clause
purposes.
A. Theory and Doctrine Justify Treating Causes of Action as
Constitutional Property
First, the due process cases are not entirely irrelevant. Though they
should be distinguished from the takings cases, they do comport with a
historical approach recognizing that private property in the takings context
is not limited to real property;23 nor, more important, is such property
limited to tangible objects. The due process decisions recognized property
rights in employment and welfare or other government benefits; 24 takings
doctrine, too, has historically recognized a wide range of tangible and
intangible property rights. The Supreme Court made this explicit almost a
Property, 93 YALE L.J. 541, 541 n.5 (1984) (noting the Court's use of property definition from a
due process case in the context of takings clause claim in Texaco v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982)).
19. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960); see Massey, supra note 18, at 541 n.5. But
see TRIBE, supra note 18, at 459 n. I1 (contrary view).
20. Merrill, sapra note 9, at 958; Jack M. Beermann, Government Official Torts and the
Takings Clause: Federalism and State Sovereign Immunit,, 68 B.U. L. REV. 277, 301 (1988);
Massey, supra note 18, at 553 n.71 (suggesting that a "precise analogue between the due process
and just compensation cases is therefore impossible").
21. Lingle v. Chevron, U.S.A., 544 U.S. 528, 540 (2005).
22. An early case indicating that certain causes of action are "property" for Takings Clause
purposes is Gray v. United States, No. 7, French Spoliations, 1800 WL 1537 at *38 (Ct. Cl. May
17, 1886). In Gray, the Court addressed certain claims against France for indemnity that were
affected by 1885 American legislation. The Court declined to say "that for all purposes these
claims were 'property' in the ordinarily accepted and in the legal sense of the word"; but, it
asserted, "they were rights which had value, a value inchoate, to be sure, and entirely dependent
upon adoption and enforcement by the Government; but an actual money value capable of
ascertainment the moment the Government had adopted them and promised to enforce them." Id.
Modern courts have distinguished Gray as simply an advisory opinion. E.g., Abrahim-Youri v.
United States, 139 F.3d 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Note, however, that Abrahim-Youri recognized
that a particular claim, brought before an international tribunal, was "property." Id. at 1465-66.
23. This seems so despite an evident favoritism for land in terms of affording takings
protection. E.g., Pefialver, supra note 7 (noting such a favoritism, though in the context of
regulatory takings doctrine rather than physical takings).
24. See sources cited supra notes 9 11.
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century ago: "[The eminent domain] power extends to tangibles and
intangibles alike. A chose in action, a charter, or any kind of contract are,
along with land and movables, within the sweep of this sovereign
authority., 25  Franchises have long been considered property for takings
26purposes, as have various intellectual property rights such as trade
secrets, 27 football teams,28 hunting rights, 29 interest on attorney-client trust
funds, 30 and, arguably, copyrights
3' and patents. 32
25. City of Cincinnati v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 223 U.S. 390, 400 (1912)
(emphasis added); see also City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d 835, 840 (Cal. 1982)
("Numerous . . . decisions both federal and state have expressly acknowledged that intangible
assets are subject to condemnation."). But cf Lisa J. Tobin-Rubio, Casenote, Eminent Domain
and the Commerce Clause Defense: City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV.
1185, 1191-92 (1987) (noting some courts' reluctance to allow condemnation of intangible
property rights, either because of difficulty of determining value or because of contingent nature
of property rights).
26. E.g., W. River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. 507, 534 (1848) ("A franchise is property, and
nothing more; it is incorporeal property .... It is its character of property only which imparts to it
value, and alone authorizes in individuals a right of action for invasions or disturbances of its
enjoyment."); id. (approving "[t]he power of a State, in the exercise of eminent domain, to
extinguish immediately a franchise it had granted").
27. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, 1003 04 (1984) (trade secrets are property
protected by Takings Clause). As Professors Dana and Merrill have noted, "[T]he application of
the Takings Clause to intangible rights will probably become an increasingly important issue in
the coming decades." DANA & MERRILL, supra note 1, at 228.
28. Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d at 835.
29. Swan Lake Hunting Club v. United States, 381 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1967).
30. Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1988).
3 1. See, e.g., Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Governmental Use o/ Copyrighted Property: The
Sovereign's Prerogative, 67 TEX. L. REV. 685 (1989).
32. E.g., James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 357 58 (1881) ("That the government of the
United States when it grants letters-patent for a new invention or discovery in the arts, confers
upon the patentee an exclusive property in the patented invention which cannot be appropriated or
used by the government itself, without just compensation, any more than it can appropriate or use
without compensation land which has been patented to a private purchaser, we have no doubt.");
see also DANA & MERRILL, supra note 1, at 239 ("If the government were to transfer title in a
patent to itself ... then there is no doubt this would constitute a taking."). There is nevertheless
some debate over whether patents are in fact private property for takings purposes. The passage
in ,James has been written off to some extent as dicta. See Thomas F. Cotter, Do Federal Uses of
Intellectual Property Implicate the Fifth Amendment?, 50 FLA. L. REV. 529, 543 (1998); Adam
Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The Historical Protection ofPatents under
the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689, 709 (2007); Davida H. Isaacs, Not All Property is
Created Equal. Why Modern Courts Resist Applying the Takings Clause to Patents, and Why
They, Are Right to Do So, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1 (2007). Case law is also somewhat in
tension. Compare Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (indicating that
patents are not private property for takings clause purposes), with Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 772 (2002) (drawing from regulatory takings doctrine to
suggest that patent rights reflect owners' legitimate expectations). Professor Mossoff suggests
that as a historical matter, patents were protected as private constitutional property, though
modern courts and scholars are, he claims, no longer aware of the line of cases showing that.
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Second, and importantly, a range of more abstract rights-that is, not
simply intangible property-have been viewed as private property
protected by the Takings Clause, in a variety of contexts.33  Contractual
rights,34 liens,35 and lease rights,36 for instance, have all been so seen. Even
more critical for the present analysis, the right not only to bring a takings
claim, 37 but also the right to sue more generally, may be considered private
property for other purposes, including aspects of due process,38 the mail
fraud statute, 39 RICO cases, 40 and even post-divorce division of property.
41
Mossoff, supra, at 700 11 (reviewing nineteenth-century cases recognizing Takings Clause
protection for patents).
33. James Madison's classic statement that a "man may be ... said to have a property in his
rights," James Madison, Property, NAT'L GAZETTE (March 5, 1792), in JAMES MADISON, THE
MIND OF THE FOUNDER 186 (Marvin Meyer ed., 1981), may be somewhat of an overstatement
for present purposes. See William C. Heffeman, Privacy Rights, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 737,
757 n. 117 (1995). There is little question, however, that a range of intangible rights has been
recognized as property.
34. U. S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. I, 19 n.16 (1977) ("[C]ontract rights are
a form of property and as such may be taken for a public purpose provided that just compensation
is paid."); City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 534 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting)
("Contractual rights, this Court has held, are property, and [under the Fifth Amendment a state
may take] those property rights as it would any other property, provided it is willing to pay for
what it has taken."); Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934) (holding that valid
contracts are property protected by Takings Clause).
35. E.g., Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960) (holding that property right in
liens is protected by Takings Clause).
36. E.g., Kaufmann's Carousel, Inc. v. City of Syracuse Indus. Dev. Agency, 750 N.Y.S.2d
212, 218 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (holding that lease rights were private property subject to
condemnation through eminent domain).
37. Dunlap v. Toledo & A.A.R. Co., 15 N.W. 555 (Mich. 1883); Carol Necole Brown,
Taking the Takings Claim: A Policy and Economic Analysis of the Survival of Takings Claims
After Property Transfers, 36 CONN. L. REV. 7, 34 (2003) (arguing that a takings claim is itself a
form of private property); Steven J. Eagle, The 1997 Regulatory Takings Quartet: Retreating
from the "Rule ofLaw, " 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 345, 392 (1988) (arguing that "the taking of a
takings claim is . . . itself a taking").
38. E.g., Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 804 (1996) (in due process context,
chose of action is property interest "in its own right"); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S.
797, 807 (1985) (a chose in action is a "constitutionally recognized property interest").
39. United States v. Adler, 186 F.3d 574, 576 (4th Cir. 1999) (in mail fraud context, plaintiff
creditor "clearly had a property interest in the chose in action"); United States v. Holzer, 840 F.2d
1343, 1348 (7th Cir. 1988) (in mail fraud context, suggesting that chose in action is a property
right itself).
40. E.g., Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc. v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 792 F.2d 341, 354 (3d Cir.
1986) (in RICO context, noting that "[a] cause of action, of course, is a form of 'property"').
41. E.g., Schauer v. Mandarin Gems of Cal., Inc., 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 233, 238 (Cal. App. 4th
2005) (in divorce context, potential cause of action was personal property retained by potential
plaintiff, absent express provision otherwise); Redfern v. Collins, 113 F. Supp. 892 (E.D. Tex.
1953).
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Third, for Takings Clause purposes, "property" is defined by state law.
That is, because "the Constitution protects rather than creates property
interests, the existence of a property interest is determined by reference to
'existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source
such as state law.' 42  Consensus among states' definitions of property is
suggestive that the object-here, a cause of action-is one so well
recognized that it warrants constitutional protection.43 Most states clearly
define choses in action and the right to sue as "property."
44
Fourth, under the federal Bankruptcy Code, causes of action are
explicitly considered the type of "legal or equitable interests" that
constitute property of the debtor's estate.45  This is the case whether the
lawsuit has been filed or not, so long as the injury occurred before the
commencement of the bankruptcy.46 It is also so whether the cause of
action would ordinarily be one that the plaintiff could not transfer or assign,
42. Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 164 (1988) (quoting Bd. of Regents of
State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). At least one commentator has noted serious
potential difficulties if this statement is taken fully at face value. See Gregory Gelfand, "Taking"
Informational Property Through Discovery, 66 WASH U. L.Q. 703, 713 (1988); see infra note
Ill and accompanying text.
43. Gelfand, supra note 42, at 714-15 ("[T]he fact that the law of most or all states defines
something as property is strong evidence that it is general property," that is, property meriting
Takings Clause protection); see also 2 JULIUS SACKMAN ET AL., NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN
§ 5.01[5][c], at 5-35 (3d. 1997) (stating that the first question for defining "property" for eminent
domain purposes is whether the interest is recognized as property under state law). Cf infra notes
127 131 and accompanying text.
44. United States v. Stonehill, 83 F.3d 1156, 1159-60 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to
California Civil Code and case law as including causes of action, whether sounding in contract or
tort, as property); Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 594 S.E.2d 1, 12 (N.C. 2004) ("Without question,
vested rights of action are property, just as tangible things are property."); Duckworth v. Mull, 55
S.E. 850, 852 (N.C. 1906) ("A right to sue for an injury is a right of action; it is a thing in action,
and is property."); Valero Eastex Pipeline Co. v. Jarvis, 990 S.W.2d 852, 855 (Tex. App. 1999)
("The general rule in Texas is that a cause of action is a property right."); Hall & Farley v. Ala.
Term. & Improv. Co., 39 So. 285 (Ala. 1905); Galarza v. Union Bus Lines, Inc., 38 F.R.D. 401,
404 (S.D. Tex. 1965) (stating that under Texas law, recovery for personal injuries is a property
right); Redfern v. Collins, 113 F. Supp. 892, 895 (E.D. Tex. 1953) (noting that under Texas law,
right to sue for damages in tort is chose in action and is a property interest); Button v. Drake, 195
S.W.2d 66, 69 (Ky. Ct. App. 1946) (holding that choses in action are personal property); Md.
Cas. Co. v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 309, 311 (D. Ga. 1971) (applying Georgia law recognizing that
"a right to bring an action is property, whether actual or compensatory damages are involved"
(citing Sterling v. Sims, 72 Ga. 51 (Ga. 1883) (citation omitted))); see also Angle v. Chicago, St.
P., M. & 0. Ry. Co. 151 U.S. 1, 19 (1894) ("A right of action to recover damages for an injury is
property.").
45. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2006); see, e.g., Parker v. Goodman, 499 F.3d 616 (6th Cir.
2007); In re Cannon, 277 F.3d 838, 853 (6th Cir. 2002); Sierra Switchboard Co. v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 789 F.2d 705, 709 (9th Cir. 1986). 1 thank Charles Tabb for bringing this context to
my attention.
46 Parker, 499 F.3d at 625, 628.
Spring 20091 LEGAL CLAIMS AS PRIVATE PROPERTY
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
such as tort actions47 (a factor that becomes important in the discussion
below48). Thus, federal bankruptcy courts 49 are comfortable with the view
that even causes of action sounding in tort-the category of legal claim
courts are most reluctant to see as alienable-are private property interests
that become part of the debtor's bankruptcy estate, 50 and that may be
assigned or sold under the bankruptcy trustee's authority.
51
Fifth, other federal courts have recognized legal claims as potentially
implicating the Takings Clause, notably the Court of Federal Claims and
the Federal Circuit52 courts with jurisdiction to hear suits against the
federal government, in particular suits based on contracts with the United
States.53  Recently, for instance, the Federal Claims Court held that
although the government may be liable for a particular breach of contract, a
plaintiff had no Takings Clause claim when the government's breach did
not deprive the plaintiff "of the right to seek damages for breach of that
contract., 54 This approach echoed previous cases at the circuit level that
held that when a plaintiff is left with the recourse of bringing suit in some
forum, no taking of the contract right occurs-that is, that plaintiffs
property right in the right to sue was not taken, despite the government's
breach.55 Finally, these courts have acknowledged even more explicitly
47. See, e.g., Harold R. Weinberg, Tort Claims as Collateral: Impact on Consumer Finance,
49 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 155, 162 n.35 (1995).
48. See infa notes 71 74.
49. Each federal circuit has held that a cause of action can constitute "property" of a
bankruptcy estate. See Off. Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of PSA, Inc. v. Edwards, 437 F.3d
1145, 1149 (1 lth Cir. 2006); In re Bogdan, 414 F.3d 507, 512 (4th Cir. 2005); Off. Comm. of
Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340, 356 (3d Cir. 2001); Howe v.
Richardson, 193 F.3d 60, 61 (1st Cir. 1999) (assigning the debtor's claims arising from a motor
vehicle accident, breach of contract, and a dishonored check to the trustee of the debtor's
bankruptcy estate); Matter of Swift, 129 F.3d 792, 795 (5th Cir. 1997); In re RCS Eng'rd Prods.
Co., 102 F.3d 223, 225 (6th Cir. 1996); In re Hedged-Inv. Assoc., Inc., 84 F.3d 1281, 1285 (10th
Cir. 1996); Matter of Geise, 992 F.2d 651, 655 (7th Cir. 1993); In re CrysenMontenay Energy
Co., 902 F.2d 1098, 1101 (2d Cir. 1990); In re Ozark Rest. Equip Co., 816 F.2d 1222, 1225 (8th
Cir. 1987); Skelton v. Clements, 408 F.2d 353, 354 (9th Cir. 1969); Carmona v. Robinson, 336
F.2d 518, 519 (9th Cir. 1964) (adopting the doctrine that causes of action are property even under
the former bankruptcy code).
50. E.g., Parker, 499 F.3d at 624; Jones v. Harrell, 858 F.2d 667 (1 1th Cir. 1988) (personal
injury claims included).
51. Jones, 858 F.2d at 669.
52. See, e.g., Griffin Broadband Comms., Inc. v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 320 (Fed. Cl.
2007); Castle v. United States, 301 F.3d 1328, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
53. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2008) (setting forth jurisdiction of the Court of Federal
Claims).
54. Gritfin, 79 Fed. Cl. at 324.
55. Castle, 301 F.3d at 1342 (stating that there is no taking because "plaintiffs retained the
full range of remedies associated with any contractual property right they possessed"); see also
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that such legal claims are constitutional property-the Federal Circuit in
Alliance of Descendants of Texas Land Grants v. United States56 and
Abrahim-Youri v. United States,57 and the Court of Claims in Shanghai
Power Co. v. United States.58 In Alliance, the Court examined plaintiffs'
argument that a 1941 treaty between the United States and Mexico had
implicated a taking by the U.S. government of certain land grant claims.
As a preliminary to analyzing the substantive claim, the Court first inquired
whether those claims constituted property that had in fact been "taken," and
had no qualms about ruling that they did.59 Abrahim-Youri involved a
claim before an international tribunal that was extinguished by the U.S.
government as a result of a settlement with Iran; again, the Court held that
the claim was "property., 60 Finally, in Shanghai Power, a U.S. company
based in China had property there expropriated by the Chinese government.
The company brought an action against China that was settled, without its
consent, by the U.S. government. The settlement value was less than the
value of the claim, and the company brought suit against the U.S. for a
taking of its property-i.e., the claim against the Chinese government. The
Court of Claims held that the cause of action qualified as a property interest
61for such purposes.
United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 63 (1989) (noting that there is no taking because
although United States was taking away the attachment, it did not take Sperry's "claim against
Iran"); Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934) (where statute abrogated plaintiffs right to
bring a breach of contract claim altogether, just compensation was appropriate); In re Consol.
U.S. Atmos. Testing Litig., 820 F.2d 982, 989 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding, in the regulatory takings
context, that a statute that did not fully abrogate plaintiffs' claims did not warrant recognizing a
takings claim); Palmyra Pacific Seafoods, L.L.C. v. United States., 80 Fed. Cl. 228, 233 (Fed. Cl.
2008) ("The Government is not liable to plaintiffs for a taking because the government actions at
issue . . . neither appropriated plaintiffs' contract rights for public use nor removed plaintiffs'
right to enforce their contractual licenses or to seek a contractual remedy with their licensors.");
Castle v. United States, 48 Fed. Cl. 187, 219 (Fed. Cl. 2000) ("[T]he Takings Clause would be
implicated in the present case if the government had taken away the range of remedies associated
with the vindication of a contract."); Janicki Logging Co. v. United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 338, 346
(Fed. Cl. 1996) (finding no taking where government did not impair plaintiffs' ability to enforce
the rights delineated in the contract).
56. Alliance of Descend. of Tex. Land Grants v. United States, 37 F.3d 1478 (Fed. Cir.
1994).
57. Abrahim-Youri v. United States, 139 F.3d 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
58. Shanghai Power Co. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 237 (1983), af'd, 765 F.2d 159 (Fed.
Cir. 1985).
59. Alliance, 37 F.3d at 1481 (stating that claimants "allege that the United States 'took'
away their legal right to sue for compensation for that land. Because a legal cause of action is
property within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, claimants have properly alleged possession
of a compensable property interest." (citations omitted)).
60. Abrahim-Youri, 139 F.3d at 1465-66.
61. Shanghai Power, 4 Cl. Ct. at 239-41.
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B. Incidents of Property Justify Treating Causes of Action as
Constitutional Property
Each of the previous approaches supports a view that a legal claim is
property for Takings Clause purposes. Another approach might use the
familiar "bundle of sticks" metaphor, in which various incidents of
property are identified; to the extent an asset or right possesses these
incidents, it may be considered "property." For instance, according to the
Supreme Court, it is clear that "property" for takings purposes denotes the
"entire group of rights inhering in the citizen's [ownership,] ... as the right
to possess, use and dispose of [his property]. 62 To the extent legal claims
reflect such rights, the case for their being constitutionally protected
property increases. The more inductive approach taken by the influential
property scholar Thomas Merrill provides yet another perspective.
Professor Merrill infers a relatively narrow definition of property for
Takings Clause purposes from a review of how the Supreme Court has
decided takings cases: "property-as-ownership," with a property right being
recognized where "nonconstitutional sources of law confer an irrevocable
right on the claimant to exclude others from specific assets.
' 63
As sketched below, legal claims do reflect the doctrinally defined
incidents of property-use, destructibility, disposition, exclusion, and, in
some instances, alienability and heritability-in a number of ways.
Professor Merrill's descriptive "property-as-ownership" definition also
seems satisfied.
In terms of specific incidents of property, obviously, a plaintiff has the
power to decide whether, and how, to use his cause of action. He may
pursue a claim for remedy (or not). Subject to procedural rules concerning
venue and jurisdiction, he may decide the forum in which to pursue the
, 64claim. Further, once a lawsuit is filed, the plaintiff (at least nominally)
62. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 n.6 (1980). This broad approach,
emphasizing possessory rights and not simply the right to exclude, reflects a long historical
approach to property rights. Adam Mossoff, What is Property? Putting the Pieces Back
Together, 45 ARIz. L. REV. 371, 376 (2003) (discussing "integrated" theory of property and
suggesting that the "concept of property is explained best as an integrated unity of the exclusive
rights to acquisition, use and disposal").
63. Merrill, supra note 9, at 969 (italics omitted). C Susan Eisenberg, Note, Intangible
Takings, 60 VAND. L. REV. 667, 704 (2007) (proposing that "in order to receive protection under
the Takings Clause, an intangible interest must (1) be a well-defined asset, that (2) contains
exclusionary rights, and (3) carries an expectation of protection based on the enduring nature of
the interest").
64. E.g., Eichman v. Fotomat Corp., 880 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1989) ("When a plaintiff has
both state and federal law antitrust claims, he has the discretion to pursue a remedy in state or
federal court."); Steven A. Ramirez, Caveat Plainti!]f 67-Nov. J. KAN. B.A. 16, 18 (1998) (noting
that "a plaintiff may always forgo federal claims and seek relief under state law; thus, a plaintiff
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controls the direction and extent to which the claim will go forward.6 5
Similarly, a plaintiff may destroy his legal claim. 66 Before filing a lawsuit,
he may elect not to pursue a claim at all and allow the statute of limitations
to expire, thus ending his use rights. Even after a suit is filed, a plaintiff
retains the right to terminate it. At common law this right was nearly
absolute;6 v under contemporary rules of civil procedure a plaintiff retains
the right, subject to some restrictions. Under the federal rules, for instance,
a plaintiffs right to terminate his action simply by filing notice is absolute
and unconditional, so long as notice is filed before a defendant serves an
answer or summary judgment motion.68 Once such a pleading is served, a
plaintiffs use rights are constrained somewhat, as a "voluntary" dismissal
may only occur by stipulation or by court order.69 (Such limitations might
be analogized to the use rights incident to ownership of real property,
where an owner's right to use might involve agreements with a neighbor or
be subject to the approval of a local zoning board.)
More ambiguous, perhaps, are the rights to transfer, assign, or
alienate a legal claim, or to exclude another from using it. There is a
substantial body of case law on whether legal claims may be assigned.
70
Much of it turns on whether the cause of action is based on an injury to a
person (not transferable/assignable) or to property (transferable/assignable),
has wide discretion over which claims to pursue"); (f Alan Hanson, Cost Recovery or
Contribution?: An Overview and Resolution of the Controversy Surrounding Private PRP
Standing Under CERCLA Sections 107(a)(4)(b) and 113(9(1), 10 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV.
199, 211 (1997) (suggesting Congressional intent in CERCLA instances to allow plaintiff to
choose among different causes of action).
65. E.g., MODEL RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (1989) (noting attorney's obligation,
subject to some constraints, to abide by client's decisions about management of legal action). But
see Peter H. Huang, A New Options Theory for Risk Multipliers of Attorney's Fees in Federal
Civil Rights Litigation, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1943, 1955-57 (1998) (noting the view that in
practice, plaintiffs' attorneys are more likely to control lawsuit progress).
66. For a useful discussion of the right to destroy one's property, see Lior Jacob Strahilevitz,
The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781 (2005).
67. E.g., Michael E. Solimine & Amy E. Lippert, Deregulating Voluntarv Dismissals, 36 U.
Micti. J.L. REFORM 367, 371-72 (2003); Castator v. Boyes & Blandford, 192 N.W. 696, 697
(Mich. 1923).
68. FED. R. CIV. PROC. 41(a)(l)(i); Wilson v. City of San Jose, I l F.3d 688, 692 (9th Cir.
1997) (right is absolute); Finley Lines Joint Protective Bd. v. Norfolk S. Corp., 109 F.3d 993, 995
(4th Cir. 1997) (right is "unconditional" (citations omitted)). State rules of civil procedure
generally mirror the federal rule governing voluntary dismissals. Solimine & Lippert, supra note
67, at 376-77 (noting that thirty-seven states essentially follow Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 41(a)(l)(i)); see
id. at 406 18 (providing appendix with all states' rules).
69. FED. R. Civ. PROC. 41(a)(1)(ii) (dismissal only by stipulation); Id. at 41(a)(2) (dismissal
only by court order "upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper").
70. The transfer of claims against the federal government is for the most part prohibited. 31
U.S.C. § 3727 (2000).
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or on whether the action survives the death of the plaintiff (in which case it
is transferable/assignable). 1 On the one hand, this may limit the categories
of causes of action that might be considered private property for Takings
Clause purposes. That is, to the extent a particular right of action lacks the
incident transferability, it might be less likely under this approach to be
recognized as property. On the other hand, it is clear that an asset may be
considered "property" whether it is capable of being transferred or not. 2
Thus, to the extent state law defines a chose in action as property, its
assignability need not affect whether it is property for Takings Clause
purposes. That is, whether something may be transferred need not affect
whether the government may exercise eminent domain powers and seize it
from the present holder, so long as that thing may otherwise be considered
private property.73 Moreover, some states hold that a cause of action is
property and is alienable, even if it may not be assigned. Texas does so,
for instance, as long as the lawsuit has been filed.74 In fact, the
assignability or alienability of a cause of action may properly go more
toward a determination of its market value than of its status as a property
interest, and is thus more appropriately a just compensation question.
Finally, at least in the specific context of the federal tax lien statute, the
U.S. Supreme Court has held that whether an asset has monetary value and
whether it is transferable are relevant, but by no means dispositive factors
to consider in determining whether the asset is property. 5
Finally, causes of action are alienable, in at least three ways. The first
is the controversial one, in the sense that it involves actually selling to a
71. E.g., Accrued Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Prime Retail, Inc., 298 F.3d 291, 296 97 (4th Cir.
2002) (noting that existing and potential choses in action are assignable, so long as the underlying
cause of action would survive the death of the assignor).
72. Professional licenses, for instance, or prescription drugs. Tension exists in this context.
Compare 2 SACKMAN ET AL., supra note 43, § 5.01[5][c], at 5-35 ("The mere fact that a specific
right or interest has value does not, in and of itself, give it the status of property within the
meaning of the constitutional inhibition upon the taking of property without compensation."
footnote omitted)), with id. ("Property has been held to include every kind of right or interest,
capable of being enjoyed and recognized as such, and upon which it is practicable to place a
money value." (footnote omitted)); Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Propert, 52
STAN. L. REV. [283, 1295 96 (2000) (arguing that the fundamental purpose of considering
something "property" is to facilitate its transfer and alienability); Michael J. Hostetler, Note,
Intangible Property Under the Federal Mail Fraud Statute and the Takings Clause: A Case
Study, 50 DUKE L.J. 589, 605 06 (2000) (suggesting that "courts recognize that if someone is
willing to bargain for and exchange some form of consideration for an intangible right, then that
intangible interest is property"). See infra Section III(A).
73. This may be either through statutory or judicial declaration, as just alluded to, or by the
more general inductive approach or, as discussed below, by a broader definitional approach.
74. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 12.014(a) (Vernon 1984).
75. Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 60 n.7 (1999).
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third party the right to sue an existing defendant. Traditional objections
have focused on A's transfer or sale to C of the right to sue B. Despite a
long history of criticism,76 this is not barred in all places, and the
alienability of causes of action to third parties seems to be developing more
approbation. Second, although it also was initially subjected to some
champerty objections, the practice of contingent fee arrangements reflects
an assignment of some portion of the right to recover. 77  Third, A can
always settle with B, essentially selling A's right to recover to B-that is,
relinquishing the right for a set fee.78
Exclusion is a focal feature under Professor Merrill's description of
property for Takings Clause purposes. 79 Again, that definition suggests
76. See generally Marcushamer, supra note 2 (discussing development of champerty,
barratry, and maintenance, but noting that more and more states are doing away with these
doctrines, either through case law or statute).
77. Courtney R. Barksdale, Note, All That Glitters isn't Gold: Analvzing the Costs and
Benefits of Litigation Finance, 26 REV. LITIG. 707, 716-17 (2007) ("[T]here are many exceptions
to champerty laws-most notably, attorney contingent fees."); Susan Lorde Martin, Syndicated
Lawsuits: Illegal Champerty or New Business Opportunis?, 30 AM. BUS. L.J. 485, 489-91
(1992) (similar discussion); Julia H. McLaughlin, Litigation Funding: Charting a Legal and
Ethical Course, 31 VT. L. REv. 615, 625 (2007) (noting initial prohibition under champerty
doctrine, as well as relaxation of prohibition at the turn of the twentieth century).
78. Michael Abramowicz, On the Alienability of Legal Claims, 114 YALE L.J. 697, 744
(2005) ("[O]ne form of alienation is permitted settlement."); Ari Dobner, Comment, Litigation
Jbr Sale, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1529, 1537 38 (1995-96); Merrill, supra note 9, at 988 89 ("[A]n
unadjudicated cause of action often has a monetary value it can be settled before trial for
consideration."). Foreshadowing the discussion in Section 11, one reason the government might
want to condemn A's right would be to avoid such settlement; for instance, perhaps the
government would want a case to go to judgment.
79. Merrill, supra note 9, at 969. Indeed, Merill has argued that exclusion is the paramount
feature of property generally. Thomas P. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L.
RFV. 730, 730 (1998) (right to exclude is the "sine qua non" of property); id. at 731 (right to
exclude is a "necessary and sufficient condition of identifying the existence of property"). He
does so even more strongly than the usual panegyrics to exclusion as the hallmark right of
property. E.g., Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsec. Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673
(1999) ("The hallmark of a protected property interest is the right to exclude others."); Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) (right to exclude is "universally held to be a
fundamental element of the property right"). But see Eric Claeys, Property 101: Is Proper' a
Thing or a Bundle?, SEATTLE U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (critiquing the centrality of the right
to exclude).
College Savings Bank is especially relevant in the present context, given its apparent
focus on exclusion to reject plaintiffs putative claim that its cause of action was a property right.
According to some, "Justice Scalia held that an unadjudicated cause of action for false advertising
was not 'property' because false advertising protections do not grant any exclusionary rights."
Eisenberg, supra note 63, at 699; see also Merrill, supra note 9, at 910. But c' inra Section I(C)
(criticizing cases holding that unadjudicated causes of action do not qualify as property for
Takings Clause purposes).
If that statement were correct, the argument here might be challenged, especially in this
exclusion context. A close reading of the case at the district court and Supreme Court levels,
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that protection under the Clause exists when what is to be taken is a
specific asset, upon which nonconstitutional sources of law have conferred
upon the owner an irrevocable right to exclude others.8° In the context of a
cause of action, this definition may be problematic; one might argue that
there is no specific asset from which another user might be excluded. Nor
is it immediately obvious that there is a clear way in which "exclusion"
might function. Under a strict reading of Merrill's definition, this might
defeat the idea of causes of action as property.8'
This exclusion objection, however, is not fatal. First, as sketched
above, the right to sue (or the reified lawsuit brought to vindicate the injury
underlying that right) is an asset, not simply a right or an incident of
however, suggests that it is an imprecise characterization of the holding. Justice Scalia asserted
that the Lanham Act did not create a property right in what the bank was trying to sue to
protect-not that it did not create a property right in the suit itself That latter issue was simply
not addressed. The Court framed the bank's requests as "two species of 'property' rights: (1) a
right to be free from a business competitor's false advertising about its own product, and (2) a
more generalized right to be secure in one's business interests," Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at
672-neither of which was recognized as property, but neither of which involves the actual right
to sue. Similarly, the district court framed what the Act protected as "the right to be free from
false advertising," and found no precedent to suggest that that right was a property interest. Coll.
Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsec. Educ. Expense Bd., 948 F. Supp. 400, 426 (D.N.J. 1996). The
Supreme Court agreed. However, neither court in fact considered whether the right to sue was a
property interest, because that was simply not at issue. Moreover, the courts' analyses
emphasized the due process context, not the Takings Clause context.
College Savings Bank's focus on abrogation does not undercut this. That is, one
response to this point might be that the statute's effect was that the bank could not sue;
consequently, the bank's takings argument should be framed as the loss of that right, and that
what was being taken away was property. But the district court's opinion shows that not to be the
case; the abrogation question addressed whether the sovereign immunity waiver was undertaken
pursuant to proper authority. To be under proper authority it could only be undertaken under § 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment. To be a valid waiver under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment it
had to be enforcing a Fourteenth Amendment right. That right was to be protected from being
deprived of property without due process (note, again, the conflation of the due process definition
with the takings definition). And the district court, and later the Supreme Court, focused
explicitly on whether "the right to be free from false advertising" was a property right that was
being deprived. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 672. Neither that, nor (over Justice Stevens's
objection) "the activity of doing business or in the activity of making a profit," was held to be a
property interest, and thus-following the logic back again-there was nothing to warrant
Fourteenth Amendment protection. Id. at 693 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Thus, there was nothing
to enforce under § 5; thus no proper authority under which to waive sovereign immunity; and,
thus, no valid waiver.
80. Merrill, supra note 9, at 969.
81. See, e.g., Alfred Hill, In Defense of our Law of Sovereign Immunity, 42 B.C. L. REV.
485, 585 (2001) ("If the right to exclude is an indispensable attribute of property rights generally,
then not only choses in action, but also contractual interests generally do not constitute
property."); see also A.M. Honord, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107, 131-
32 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961) (noting that debts due and choses in action constitute a type of claim-
something that can be owned-but "[n]o right to exclude others is involved").
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property. Second, there are reasons for not placing exclusion at the center
of the definition of property.82 In a review of some of the philosophical
groundings for the constitutional view of property, for instance, Adam
Mossoff highlights political philosophers' emphasis on the other incidents
of property-the right to use, dispose, possess-as precursors of the right
to exclude. 83 For instance, he frames the right to exclude as reflecting only
the "formal claim" that a property holder has against others, not the
substance of that claim or of the relevant property: "[I]f one speaks only of
the right to exclude, the unanswered questions remain: a right to exclude
from what? And why a right to exclude? '8 4 Mossoff's response: the focus
is "the right to exclude from the right of use, or more specifically, from the
rights of use, acquisition, and disposal., 85 Thus, the right to exclude "is the
formal means by which Anglo-American rules identify and protect the
substantive core of rights that constitute property., 86 A recent essay by
Elizabeth Glazer echoes this point, suggesting that the right to exclude acts
in the service of other rights, in particular the right to use: otherwise
confusing exceptions to the right to exclude may be made sensible if they
are seen as privileging the right to exclude when it validates the other, more
substantive rights.87  These approaches reverse Professor Merrill's
argument that those other rights are only derivative of the right to
exclude. 88 Others to raise questions about the central role for the right to
exclude include Shyamkrishna Balganesh, who suggests that in part due to
vagueness about what the right to exclude in fact constitutes, its centrality
"has in more recent times receded into the background., 89  Similarly,
82. The most trivial reason in the eminent domain context is that, of course, ownership
never affords a total right to exclude because property is always held subject to the eminent
domain power as a liability rule. So long as there is a public purpose for government
condemnation, and just compensation is given, an owner may not exclude the government. E.g.,
Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 22 (1949) ("[A]II property [is held subject to]
condemnation for the common good.").
83. Mossoff, supra note 62. Mossoffs discussion implies that exclusion might better be
thought of as exclusivity-that is, as "I am the only one who possesses this." The exclusivity
emphasis is well-articulated, and more explicit, in Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in
Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L. REv. 275 (2008). This view is consistent with the useful
discussion of "virtual property" in Eisenberg, supra note 63.
84. Mossoff, supra note 62, at 396.
85. Id.
86. Id. Cf Brown, supra note 37, at 72 ("The right of disposition is tantamount to the right
of exclusive possession and should be afforded similar protections.").
87. Elizabeth M. Glazer, Rule of (Out)Law: Property's Contingent Right to Exclude, 156 U.
PA. L. REv. 331 (2008).
88. Merrill, supra note 79.
89. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of Property, Inviolability,
and Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 593 (2008).
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Anthony Honor6 famously omitted the right to exclude from his list of
what constitutes a property right. 90 Honors's point was that the incidents
he did identify largely reflected the owner's subjection to "characteristic
prohibitions and limitations"-that is, that the right to exclude is so
vulnerable to constraint that it would be inappropriate to place that right
solely at the center of "ownership."9' Finally, well-known case law
demonstrates that even the fundamental right to exclude may give way to
other important interests.
92
Third, even if exclusion were the paradigm incident of property rights,
aspects of exclusion are present in causes of action and legal claims. The
bankruptcy example gives one sense of how exclusion might work in this
context. Recall that a cause of action, whether filed as a lawsuit or not, is a
property interest that becomes a part of the debtor's estate and that is
subject to the trustee's authority.93 The trustee may transfer or sell that
right to sue, even over the debtor's objection94--that is, the trustee may
now exclude even the debtor from exercising any use rights. Nor may the
creditors pursue the cause of action in order to satisfy the debtor's original
debt; the trustee may exclude them from pursuing their potential interests
as well.
95
90. Honord, supra note 81, at 131; see Massey, supra note 18, at 547 n.42.
91. Honord, supra note 81, at 131. Honor6 continued, however, by defining the "right to
possess" to include having "exclusive physical control of a thing" and "the claim that others
should not without permission interfere." Id.
92. E.g., PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); State v. Shack, 277 A.2d
369 (N.J. 1971); see also Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. NLRB, 172 P.3d 742 (Cal. 2007). Shack
is one of the "confusing exceptions" Professor Glazer believes is clarified by de-emphasizing
exclusion to some extent.
93. See supra notes 45-51.
94. Parker v. Goodman, 499 F.3d 616 (6th Cir. 2007).
95. E.g., Matter of Educators Group Health Trust, 25 F.3d 1281, 1284 (5th Cir. 1994)
(holding that where a cause of action is part of the bankruptcy estate, "the trustee has exclusive
standing to assert the claim"). It is true that the Bankruptcy Code in some instances protects
property of the estate even from state condemnation through eminent domain. II U.S.C.
§ 362(a)(3) (2006) (providing for an automatic stay of "any act to obtain possession of property
of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate"). See
Matter of Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R., 738 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1984); In re PMI-DVW
Real Estate Holdings, L.L.P., 240 B.R. 24, 32 (D. Ariz. 1999) (condemnation proceedings do not
fall under § 362(b)(4) exception to automatic stay provision). Note, however, that the reasoning
of In re PM-DVW Real Estate Holdings, L.L.P. may be called into question, to the extent it
distinguished between the standards to be used in eminent domain proceedings and regulatory
takings, a distinction that was rejected in Tahoe-Sierra President Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l
Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 323 (2002). Moreover, even under the automatic stay of §
362(a), where the condemnation will not unduly interfere with a debtor's reorganization plan, the
state's authority may trump the jurisdiction and authority of the bankruptcy court. The analogy
need not be pushed too far; the point is simply that causes of action are clearly considered
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Finally, the well-known standing doctrine is consistent with a right to
exclude, and with viewing causes of action as property.96  Standing
doctrine, of course, prevents someone who does not possess a right to sue
from bringing suit. Courts will simply not recognize the right of such a
"non-owner" to bring suit and will dismiss such cases. Several points are
relevant here. First, a plaintiff does not actually have a right to exclude a
third party from his lawsuit, in the sense that infringement of that right
would lead to an enforceable legal remedy. Nevertheless, a plaintiffs
"ownership" of that suit (or potential suit) will be enforced by state
mechanism-a court applying the rules of standing will recognize and
enforce that ownership. That is, although there is no remedy for
infringement on the property right involved (the right to sue)-indeed, it is
difficult to see how it is possible to infringe-by definition, no one else
may make use of that right, and the state will enforce, through the standing
doctrine, that unique right. 97  Such state action reflects the classical
approach to property rights-exclusion enforced by the state.98 Second,
again using Professor Merrill's approach, such action can imply property
for Takings Clause purposes: "[I]f a state confers on an individual the right
to exclude others from a discrete asset, that individual would have property
whether or not the state calls the interest property." 99 Third, when a cause
of action is validly transferred or assigned, it is the assignee that now has
standing as a result-as the U.S. Supreme Court recently reaffirmed.'00
Statutes granting litigant status only to a "real party in interest" emphasize
that once the cause of action is assigned, the assignor may not control the
property of a debtor's estate, and in some circumstances the property of a bankruptcy estate may
be subject to condemnation by the state for a public purpose and with just compensation.
96. Cf Balganesh, supra note 89 (emphasizing that the right to exclude is a right in the
Hohfeldian sense, imposing a duty on others not to interfere with the asset).
97. Cf Gray v. United States, No. 7, French Spoliations, 1800 WL 1537 at *37 (Ct. Cl. May
17, 1886) ("A right often exists where there is no remedy.").
98. Felix Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 374 (1954).
99. Merrill, supra note 9, at 954 n.260; see also J. Peter Byrne, What We Talk About When
We Talk About Property Rights-A Response to Carol Rose's Property as the Keystone Right?,
71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1049, 1050 (1996) ("[T]he law will support and facilitate the property
holdings that it recognizes and sanction those who interfere with them without legal warrant.").
100. Sprint Comm. Co., L.P. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2531, 2538-39 (2008)
(approving of assignee's Article IllI standing in suit for collection); see also, e.g., Tango Transp.
v. Healthcare Fin. Servs., 322 F.3d 888, 889 (5th Cir. 2003) (recognizing derivative standing for
assignee of ERISA-based suit); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Gandy, 925 S.W.2d 696, 706 (Tex.
1996) (holding that a plaintiff may have standing by virtue of a valid assignment of a cause of
action); Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice and the Constitution, 69 TENN. L. REV. 939, 974-78
(2002) (arguing that where government assigns a cause of action to a private citizen, that citizen
obtains standing to pursue the legal claim).
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action or "receive its fruits,"' 0 ' and the assignee is the one who owns the
legal claim. Thus, as in the bankruptcy context, even the injured party is
excluded from exercising use rights once a valid transfer has been enacted.
C. The "Vested Rights" Approach Justifies Treating Causes of Action as
Constitutional Property
One other important aspect of treating legal claims as property
interests must be addressed. A number of cases and commentators assert
that even if a cause of action might be considered property under some
circumstances, it will not be so viewed until it "vests." The Ninth Circuit
has suggested, for instance, that "a plaintiff has no vested right in any tort
claim for damages under state law."' 2  The U.S. Supreme Court has
spoken similarly, stating that "[n]o person has a vested interest in any rule
of law entitling him to insist that it shall remain unchanged for his
benefit."'' 0 3 Indeed, according to the Ninth Circuit, this remains true all the
way until a "final unreviewable judgment is obtained."'' 4 Such an extreme
view, however, is probably wrong, at least as a matter of history, logic,
analogy, and doctrine.
1. History
As a matter of history, Blackstone argued in the eighteenth century
that the right to sue vests at time of injury: "If a man promises or covenants
with me to do any act, and fails in it, whereby I suffer damage, the
recompense for this damage is a chose in action, for.., a right to some
recompense vests in me at the time of the damage done."' 5  Similarly,
though this is more recent history, "[O]nce a cause of action under a
particular rule of law accrues to a person by virtue of an injury to his rights,
that person's interest in the cause of action and the law which is the basis
101. E.g., Spencer v. Standard Chemicals & Metals Corp., 143 N.E. 651, 652 (N.Y. 1924)
(defining party in interest as the party possessing the right to a cause of action and control over it,
as well as the right to "receive its fruits" (citation omitted)).
102. In re Consolidated U.S. Atmospheric Testing Litig., 820 F.2d 982, 988 (9th Cir. 1987)
(citation omitted); see also Ileto v. Glock, 421 F. Supp. 2d 1274 (C.D. Cal. 2006); Jung v. Ass'n
of Am. Med. Coils., 339 F. Supp. 2d 26, 43 (D.D.C. 2004) ("Causes of actions only become
actionable property interests upon the entry of final judgment." (citing Adams v. Hinchman, 154
F.3d 420, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1998))); Grimesy v. Huff, 876 F.2d 738, 744 (9th Cir. 1989) ("[A]
party's property right in any cause of action does not vest until a final unreviewable judgment is
obtained.").
103. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 198 (1917).
104. Atmospheric Testing, 820 F.2d at 989; Grimesy, 876 F.2d at 744.
105. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *397 (alteration in original) (emphasis
added).
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for a legal action becomes vested." 10 6 This approach illustrates that some
sort of right vests in an injured person-indeed, that a right to recover in
the form of a chose in action vests in that injured person. To the extent a
chose in action is considered a property interest, 10 7 then the vesting of a
chose in action thus vests a property right as well.
2. Logic
As a matter of logic, it may nevertheless be the case that no person has
a vested right allowing him to expect that the substantive law will remain
unchanged. Even so, however, that says nothing about whether something
that could be defined as property may be taken. Under the "no vested
right" approach, a person has no absolute vested right to expect that a state
legislature might not revoke all forms of property ownership tomorrow.
That is, under this approach, an individual has "no vested interest" that
permits him to expect that a state's "rule of law" as to traditional forms of
property must "remain unchanged." But that cannot mean that the
government may not take private property, or that private property exists
but is unprotected by the Fifth Amendment. Professor Byrne has made a
similar point in the context of reversionary interests, which at common law
were inalienable, but which states have more recently made alienable.
10 8
He suggests that if a state legislature changed its mind and returned to the
inalienability of such interests, a reversionary interest holder might have "a
colorable regulatory takings claim."' 1 9 A more extreme example of such
manipulation highlights the difficulty of only attending to state law in the
definition of private property interests for constitutional purposes. Gelfand
has noted that if state law really is the final word as to defining "property"
for federal constitutional purposes, the state could simply redefine
"property" for its benefit. 10  The state could, for instance, "redefine
property to exclude land just before beginning an ambitious highway
project.""' Finally, again as a simple logical matter, whether a cause of
action has vested or reached final judgment has no impact on its
alienability; thus, to the extent that a cause of action is defined as property
by whether it may be transferred or sold,"12 the vesting issue is irrelevant.
106. Berry ex reL Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 676 (Utah 1985).
107. See cases cited supra note 44.
108. Byrne, supra note 99, at 1052.
109. Id.
110. Gelfand, supra note 42, at 713.
111. Id.
112. See supra note 72; infra Section Ill(A).
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3. Analogy
As a matter of analogy, the distinction between vested and contingent
future interests is instructive. That is, courts' emphasis on vested rights
that have not proceeded all the way to a final judgment reflects, in part, a
concern about the contingent nature of those rights. This emphasis
suggests that (1) because they may be subject to legislative change, and (2)
(as the focus on a "final, unreviewable judgment" suggests) because the
outcome of the suit is indeterminate and thus difficult to value, property
interests in the lawsuit are too remote or contingent to be considered
compensable. " 
3
For a number of reasons, however, this reasoning is inapposite. First,
although the majority approach may be not to afford compensation to the
holder of a contingent future interest when the land in which that interest is
held is condemned, that approach is questioned both by case law and
commentators on equitable and logical grounds. 14  Indeed, at least one
prominent commentator sees no constitutional difference between the two
types of remainder." 5  Second, there is debate over whether other
indeterminate or "remote" property interests should be compensated when
the land in which that interest is held is condemned. Again, although a
majority view sees inchoate dower rights as too remote or difficult to
valuate, several courts have been reluctant to take this approach."
6
Further, when that approach is taken, it reflects a due process perspective
that focuses on vested rights, not a Takings Clause perspective that
113. E.g., Laura A. Burney, Just Compensation and the Condemnation of Future Interests:
Empirical Evidence of the Failure of Fair Market Value, 1989 B.Y.U. L. REV. 789, 802-03; cf
Tobin-Rubio, supra note 25, at 1191-92 (noting some courts' reluctance to allow condemnation
of intangible property rights, either because of difficulty of determining value or because of
contingent nature of property rights).
114. Patrick v. Miss. State Highway Comm'n, 184 So.2d 850, 853 (Miss. 1966) ("We decline
to follow the majority rule which denies compensation to owners of all future interests taken by
the state. There is no rational basis for such a general doctrine. It is not equitable, and is not
consistent with other legal principles related to such existing estates in land."); see Burney, supra
note 113, at 801 (noting courts' and legislatures' consistent recognition "that the owners of
reversions and remainders, whether vested or contingent, are entitled to share in a condemnation
award based on the fair market value of the entire fee"); id at 802-10 (reviewing approaches to
the compensation of future interest holders). Cf Watson v. United States, 34 F. Supp. 777, 779
(D.C.N.C. 1940) (suggesting that a remainderman, vested or contingent, "ha[s] an immediate
cause of action" and should make a claim for compensation upon the condemnation, not wait
until the remainder interest comes into being).
115. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 226 (1985) (arguing that there is no "distinction between vested and contingent
remainders: both are property, albeit in different forms and with different values").
116. See 2 SACKMAN ET AL., supra note 43, § 5.03[6][a], at 5-151 to 5-152 (discussing cases
on inchoate dower rights).
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emphasizes the transfer of title from an individual to the sovereign. 1" 7
Finally the majority view of restrictive covenants in fact recognizes such
interests-contingent and difficult to value as they are-as compensable
under the Fifth Amendment." 
18
Third, a different approach is taken by the Restatement of Property,
called the imminency or probability test. 1 9 This approach typically denies
compensation to future interest holders unless the event that would trigger
the interest holder's taking possession is imminent, that is, will occur
within a reasonably short time.' 20 Again, this approach-rejected as unfair
by some courts12'--emphasizes the remoteness or indeterminacy of the
future interest becoming possessory; such lack of imminency mandates that
it does not qualify as a compensable interest.
However, applying this test to the actual taking of a cause of action
leads to a flawed outcome. It may be that the outcome of the lawsuit is
indeterminate (and thus more like a contingent than a vested future
interest). But under the present analysis, it is the right to sue itself-the
lawsuit itself-that is being taken away, not the final outcome. The lawsuit
is determinate, and is a valid, possessory interest, though the outcome may
be uncertain. A better analogy might be that the remainder itself was being
taken by eminent domain, not the land in which the remainderman had an




Finally, and most importantly, doctrinal factors militate against such a
strict reading of the vesting issue in defining causes of action as property
for Takings Clause purposes. One such factor is the distinction between
common law claims and those based on statutory authority, as highlighted
in a line of Illinois cases. These cases suggest that legal claims based on
common law claims vest upon accrual of the cause of action-as
Blackstone and Berry suggest-but statutorily derived causes of action do
117. Id. at n.177.
118. Id. § 5.07[4][a], at 5-378. But see id. nn.90-93 (citing cases arguing that restrictive
covenant are not property interests but rather contract rights that are enforceable against others
but not against the government, and, thus, taking them is not taking a vested interest).
119. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 53 (1936).
120. Id. cmts. b & c.
121. E.g., State v. Indep. School Dist., 123 N.W.2d 121, 129 (Minn. 1963); Ink v. City of
Canton, 212 N.E.2d 574, 578 (Ohio 1965); Hemphill v. Miss. State Highway Comm'n, 145 So.2d
455 (Miss. 1962); Columbus & Greenville Railway Co. v. City of Greenwood, 390 So.2d 588,
591-92 (Miss. 1980).
122. Burney, supra note 113, at 801.
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not vest until reduced to judgment and appeals are exhausted.'2 3 Federal
courts applying Illinois law have recognized the distinction as well, 24 and
at least one commentator has read the Supreme Court's case law to suggest
that when "an abrogated right is a traditional common law right, such as a
tort right," it will be protected "as a property interest."'
2 5
Moreover, this distinction mirrors the Supreme Court's approach in
other areas of takings doctrine, in particular, the recurring notion of settled
expectations regarding property as warranting heightened property rights
protection. This idea is prominent, of course, in the Supreme Court's
regulatory takings analysis. However, it also reflects the Court's early
statements in Munn v. Illinois, where Chief Justice Waite stated that a
"person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of the common
law.' ' 126  The Chief Justice continued, nevertheless, "[r]ights of property
which have been created by the common law cannot be taken away without
due process[.]',
127
It is relevant too to the way in which the Court has treated the
definition of property rights for Takings Clause purposes. Specifically, the
Court emphasized in Phillips that federal courts must look to sources other
than the federal Constitution in defining property interests-to state law in
particular. 128  As Professor Merrill points out, Phillips emphasized
"established" common law rules, ones "firmly embedded in the common
law of the various States," ones that reflected "traditional property law
principles," ones that had a long "historical pedigree."' 129 He argues that for
the Court, more recent definitions of property interests, as well as statutory
definitions, could not justify an individual holding settled expectations
123. Robert C. Feldmeier, Armstead and its Progeny: The Illinois Supreme Court's "Vested
Rights" Approach to the Application of Statutory Amendments to Pre-Existing Cases or Causes
of Action, 25 S. ILL. U. L.J. 95, 121 (2000); see also 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 105; see
generally Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 676 (Utah 1985).
124. See Kopec v. City of Elmhurst, 193 F.3d 894, 906 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, C.J.,
dissenting) (noting that under Illinois law, "common law rights, unlike Illinois statutory rights,
can vest"); Jackson v. Resolution, No. 94 C 255, WL 158319 at * 1 n.5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 1997)
("While a vested cause of action, 'whether emanating from contract or common law principles,
may constitute property beyond the power of the legislature to take away,' it is clear that causes
of action created by a legislature through statute do not generally constitute vested property
rights." (citing DeRodulfa v. United States, 461 F.2d 1240, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1972), affd, 136 F.3d
1130 (7th Cir. 1998))).
125. Radin, supra note 4, at 1336-37; see id. at 1349 ("When a plaintiff has an accrued cause
of action based on established common law doctrines, courts are likely to find a property
interest.").
126. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1877) (due process context).
127. Id.
128. See sources cited supra note 42.
129. Merrill, supra note 9, at 897 (citations omitted).
about the property defined, and that the Court thus ignored such definitions
in determining the relevant property interests. 130  This perspective also
undergirded the Court's reluctance to find a property interest in cases
involving rights to benefits conferred by statute. Merrill concludes that
"long-established common law rules [may be] central to the identification
of "'true' property interests, whereas rules enacted by regulatory agencies
are not."' 3 1  Of course, the "historical pedigree" of the right to sue to
vindicate one's interests is as old as the institution of law itself.
But even this distinction may be overbroad or inapposite. Again, the
inquiry here goes toward defining property for condemnation purposes, not
regulatory takings. Cases holding that no property right vests are typically
in the context of regulatory takings analysis. For example, Atmospheric
Testing addressed whether legislative action substituting a claim against the
government for a claim against a private contractor constituted a taking of
property. 132 The court there applied Penn Central's "ad-hoc" regulatory
takings test by looking at plaintiffs' expectations, the nature of the property
right, and the nature of the government action.' 33  Again, this is a
fundamentally different analysis from the more straightforward eminent
domain tests: 34 as the federal circuit has noted, applying the former test is
problematic where "the choses in action were not simply regulated in some
manner, but were terminated[.]"'
135
When they do not involve regulatory takings, these cases apply due
process analysis, rather than takings analysis. For instance, Adams v.
Hinchman, cited above, framed its question as a due process one, explicitly
applying the due process test later rejected by Lingle.136  The Ninth
Circuit's Atmospheric Testing discussion was similar, to the extent that it
cited Zimmerman Brush and Mullane in defining causes of action as
"species of property"; this was so despite the Court's recognition that a due
130. Id. at 897-98.
131. Id. at 898.
132. In re Consol. U.S. Atmospheric Testing Litig., 820 F.2d 982, 988 (9th Cir. 1987).
133. Id. at 988-89.
134. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
135. Abrahim-Youri v. United States, 139 F.3d 1462, 1465-66 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (recognizing
that the trial court had applied the Penn Central regulatory takings analysis, and noting the
potential difficulties in doing so).
136. Adams v. Hinchman, 154 F.3d 420, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1998); D. Benjamin Barros,
Hadacheck v. Sebastian 6 (Widener Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No.
08-08, 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1086468 (noting that "in its 2005 decision in
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, however, the Court expressly recognized that the
substantive due process analysis contained in these early cases should not be applied in
contemporary regulatory-takings cases, casting doubt on the continuing relevance of early [such]
cases.").
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process claim for the deprivation of property should be distinguished from
a claim that property was taken without just compensation.' Finally, even
these due process cases recognize the distinction between prospective and
retrospective interference with causes of action.138 Prospective regulations
that diminish or eliminate unaccrued causes of action (or defenses) do not
implicate property rights. 139  However, where "a law changes the legal
consequences of past actions, it interferes with vested rights, and courts
have found that property. .. is implicated." That is, a cause of action vests
upon the occurrence of an injury, and that "vested right of action is
property in the same sense in which tangible things are property, and is
equally protected against arbitrary interference."'
' 40
Scholarship reflects these tensions as well. For example, in a recent
article addressing certain procedural restrictions on asbestos litigation, the
authors apply the vested rights line of cases that hold that a cause of action
does not vest until it is final and unreviewable.141 However, the article also
acknowledged the contrary opinion that it does vest before that point.
42
But their discussion of vested rights is explicitly in a due process
context. 143  When they subsequently do turn to a takings analysis, they
acknowledge that there "is not a taking in the classic sense, such as occurs
when the government appropriates land for road expansion or some other
government use. Unimpaired plaintiffs retain ownership of their causes of
action and the benefits to be derived from them."'144 Importantly, the
authors note a state court case holding that no taking occurs where a
plaintiff retains access to the justice system-a holding consistent with
137. Atmospheric Testing, 820 F.2d at 988-89.
138. See Radin, supra note 4, at 1328-33.
139. Radin, supra note 4, at 1328-29 (collecting examples); see Borgnos v. Falk Co., 133
N.W. 209, 222 (Wis. 1911) ("The right to bring an action in the future ... is subject to change by
the lawmaking power at any time."); Sayles v. Foley, 96 A. 340, 347 (R.I. 1916) (stating that until
"the occurrence of an accident there is no property right growing out of it"). But cf. EPSTEIN,
supra note 115, at 97-98 ("If you deny the plaintiff the prima facie right to recover against a
stranger without proof of negligence, then you have taken a limited property interest; if you deny
the plaintiff the right to recover for certain nuisances, then you have created an easement to cause
a nuisance."). The latter is what happened (albeit in the regulatory takings context) in Bormann v.
Board of Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1998), where state-created agricultural centers that
gave users immunity from nuisance suits (similar to "right-to-farm" statutes) were struck down as
having taken neighbors' right to be free from nuisances.
140. Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U.S. 124, 132 (1882).
141. Mark A. Behrens & Manuel L6pez, Unimpaired Asbestos Dockets: They Are
Constitutional, 24 REV. LITIG. 253 (2005).
142. id.
143. Id. at 281-86.
144. Id. at 294 (emphasis added).
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federal courts. 145 Because in adjusting the asbestos litigation docket there
is no actual seizure of the right to sue qua property, the authors,
emphasizing the Tahoe distinction on which I have also focused, move to a
regulatory takings analysis-the sort of analysis I suggest is inapposite
under my framework-i.e., where there is an actual seizure of the
plaintiffs property, and an attendant denial of the plaintiffs access to
court.
The authors do briefly address the takings issue further by suggesting
that, given their earlier discussion of vested property rights, there is simply
no property right at issue. 146 First, however, this imports a due process
definition of property to the takings context, which I have suggested is
inappropriate (though the authors do recognize the distinction). 147 Second,
their discussion involves delays in the progress of a plaintiffs lawsuit, not
the confiscation of that lawsuit or the plaintiffs right to sue. 148 Third, they
suggest that a claimant must show a property interest in having his claim
resolved "quickly or by a particular date.', 149  This last focus seems
misplaced, however, especially given the substantial case law suggesting
that it is the cause of action that is property-that is, the property right
inheres in the claim itself, not in how that claim is resolved.
5. Summary: Vested Rights Doctrine
In light of the above discussion, it is clear that when an injury occurs,
a cause of action arises in which the injured party has a property interest.
Some case law suggests that this interest may not be a vested right, and
thus is insufficient to warrant Takings Clause protection. For a number of
reasons, however, I suggest that this case law has taken the wrong
perspective. The better approach reflects Blackstone's emphasis on the
point at which the injury accrues: If a right to sue is taken before a tort or
other injury happens, then no property interest has been infringed upon.
However, if the right is taken away after the injury, then there has been
interference with a vested right and thus constitutional protection is
warranted. This seems to be what the vested versus unvested distinction
boils down to (or should).
Even if the case law's approach is more persuasive, and the property
right does not vest at the time of injury, a stronger case might be made for
145. See id. at 294 for discussion of the state case. For examples of federal courts taking this
approach, see supra note 55.
146. Behrens & L6pez, supra note 141, at 294-98.
147. Id. at 297.
148. Id. at 298.
149. Id. at 297.
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the vesting of that property interest once a lawsuit is filed. When an
injured plaintiff commences an action, complying with established
guidelines for how to obtain the remedy associated with that injury, doing
so activates expectations about how the machinery of the state will be used.
Condemning that lawsuit through eminent domain takes a property interest
and violates those settled expectations, thus warranting just compensation.
A number of different lines of reasoning support this perspective.
First, it is consistent with the Court's case law. In particular, it is consistent
with the important aspects of Roth's approach to defining property. Again,
property interests stem from the independent source of state law' 5°-i.e.,
the rules that establish the procedures and settled expectations
accompanying the process of a lawsuit once. filed (or even the rules that
establish that an injury has occurred, such that once an injury occurs an
interest is created). And again, in addressing the infringement on
individual rights, the focus is on the importance of protecting an interest
once an individual obtains it, not before. 5 '
Second, it is consistent with useful scholarship on the constitutional
protection of causes of action, whether in the due process or takings
context. Of course, it comports with the prospective/retrospective
distinction made above.1 52 That is, once a lawsuit is filed, subsequent
action by the sovereign interferes not with possible or potential rights that
might accrue in the future, but with existing expectations and rights that
have accrued-that have "vested"-and that constitute a property
interest.'53  Similarly, Professor Beermann has applied Reich's "new
property" analysis to argue that "a cause of action might be thought of as
an entitlement to employ the state's adjudicatory machinery which can only
be denied for cause, cause being the failure to establish the elements of the
cause of action or to comply with reasonable procedural requirements."'
' 54
This reflects the Court's other definition of the "hallmark" of property in
Logan: "an individual entitlement grounded in state law, which cannot be
removed except for cause."
155
Third, the distinction between the right to sue once an injury accrues
and the entitlement afforded by the commencement of that suit-with the
stronger constitutional protection warranted by the latter-highlights
scholars' approach to defining property for Takings Clause purposes.
150. Bd. of Regents of State Coils. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
151. Roth, 408 U.S. at 576.
152. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
154. Beermann, supra note 20, at 305 n. 121.
155. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430 (1982)
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Determining whether vested rights exist implicates whether the property
owner has a "legitimate claim of entitlement."' 5 6 This is, of course, the
language Professor Merrill uses to distinguish property that warrants
constitutional protection from that which consists of a mere "expectation,"
such as certain government benefits, that does not warrant such
protection.157 Clearly, the plaintiff has no "entitlement" to the damages
sought, or to any form of successful resolution of the lawsuit, as he might
lose on the merits or because of procedural aspects of the case. But just as
clearly, the plaintiffs interest in the lawsuit itself should qualify as an
"entitlement that may be terminated only for cause" that should warrant
constitutional protection.
1 58
D. Practical Considerations Justify Treating Causes of Action as
Constitutional Property
Finally, quite apart from this extended academic analysis, causes of
action may, in practice, be treated as property. First, calls for a market for
legal causes of action, even in the tort and personal injury context, have
been made, directly or indirectly, in a number of disparate contexts.
59
Although these ideas have not yet widely taken hold, economic and other
normative arguments have developed a framework for that possibility.'
60
Further, syndication of lawsuits has increased and in some cases has
withstood legal challenge.1 6' In related fashion, courts are doing away with
champerty and maintenance doctrines that once precluded the sale of legal
claims. 162 In contractual contexts, or others in which agreements can be
made ex ante, canny choice-of-law arrangements could select a jurisdiction
where so-called "champertous" agreements are allowed. 63  Second, as
discussed further in Section 1II, a lawsuit may be seen as a real option.'
64
156. Kenneth R. Kupchak et al., Arrow of Time: Vested Rights, Zoning Estoppel, and
Development Agreements in Hawai'i, 27 U. HAW. L. REV. 17, 25 (2004).
157. Merrill, supra note 9, at 921-22.
158. Id. at928.
159. Martin, supra note 77; Marcushamer, supra note 2; Abramowicz, supra note 78;
Dobner, supra note 78; Roy D. Simon, Jr., Lawsuit Syndication: Buying Stock in Justice, 69 BUS.
& Soc. REV. 10 (1989).
160. E.g., Abramowicz, supra note 78; Dobner, supra note 78.
161. See Martin, supra note 77; see also Simon, supra note 159.
162. See, e.g., Andrew Hananel & David Staubitz, Current Development, The Ethics of Law
Loans in the Post-Rancman Era, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 795, 802 (2004) (noting that New
Jersey and Massachusetts have done away with champerty and maintenance doctrines).
163. See Dobner, supra note 78, at 1531-38 (noting this possibility).
164. See generally Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, The Unexpected Value of
Litigation, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1267 (2006); Huang, supra note 65. But see generally Robert J.
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Several recent commentators have discussed markets in real options; such
an approach suggests (to the extent that alienability defines property
interests) that an option-the right to take or decline action vis-A-vis
another person, such as whether to sue-could be a property right.1
65
Indeed, the modem trend in case law suggests that for takings purposes,
options are compensable property rights. 1
66
E. Summary
A plausible case can thus be made that causes of action are private
property for Takings Clause purposes and, as such, are subject to seizure
through eminent domain by a government body. Why would a government
body do so, and what obligations might it incur if it does? I turn in the next
Sections to the public use and just compensation limits on the eminent
domain power.
II. "Taken for Public Use"
It is unsurprising that government actors might seek to condemn land
in order to use it themselves for public purposes. It is also no surprise that
government might regulate the use of land in order to maintain the public
welfare, as in the prototypical regulatory takings case. Nor is it unusual for
legislatures to pass or revoke laws that affect what might be seen as
property rights in government benefits or largesse.
What might seem odd, however, is for the government to actually take
away someone's cause of action-that is, not to regulate the form, manner,
and procedure in which an individual may sue, but to actually transfer
ownership of that action to itself or to another private party. In this Section
I sketch possible reasons why the government might take such action. In
addition, I connect this discussion with current takings doctrine's
characterization of the operative terms "take" and "public use." When the
Rhee, The Effect of Risk on Legal Vahlation, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 193 (2007) (critiquing
Grundfest and Huang's approach).
165. E.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1399, 1412 (2005)
(discussing the right that an option contract gives); Bradford Cornell, The Incentive to Sue: An
Option-Pricing Approach, 19 J. LEGAL STUDIES 173, 174 (1990) ("Filing a lawsuit is analogous
to purchasing an option."); see also 2 SACKMAN ET AL., supra note 43, § 5.08[2], at 5-388
(identifying a case where Supreme Court of Washington held that the right of first refusal to buy
property was a "fundamental attribute of ownership and a valuable property right" that could not
be taken from property owners under the eminent domain provision of the state's constitution).
166. E.g., Peerless Park v. Cent. Holding Corp., 42 S.W.3d 814 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (lease
with option to purchase land established property right in the option); 2 SACKMAN ET AL., supra
note 43, § 5.02[3][a], at 5-66 ("Recent legal trends support the conclusion that an owner of an
unexercised option to purchase land possesses a property right that is compensable in eminent
domain.").
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government acts in this way, is it in fact "taking" an individual's private
property? Is that taking in fact "for public use?"
Government condemnation of a party's right to sue could come in at
least four contexts, reflecting two orthogonal dimensions. One dimension
is the goal of the taking, either offensive or defensive. Offensive goals
might be to achieve particular results in litigation, to ensure that an action
continues where, perhaps, a current litigant does not have the resources to
pursue it or pursue it effectively, or perhaps to avoid a settlement that
current litigants might consider. Defensive goals might be to protect a
defendant against a plaintiffs claims, whether through more effective
defense, through settlement, or through non-use of the action until a statute
of limitations expires.167 The second dimension is who obtains ownership
of the cause of action: the government itself or another private party.
Under appropriate circumstances, private property may qualify as being
"taken for public use" even where it is transferred to another private
party. 1 68  Thus, the government need not be the party to end up with
ownership of the cause of action.
Accordingly, the government might take a cause of action either in
order to litigate it on its own, using more and better resources than might be
available to the initial plaintiff, or so that another private party would
litigate it. Presumably, that third party would have more or better resources
or motivation to pursue the suit, perhaps simply a party better off
financially, but perhaps a party or group able and motivated to engage in
impact or advocacy litigation, such as the ACLU, NAACP, or similar
organizations. Alternatively, the seizure might be defensive, so the
government could protect itself or a third party from a lawsuit or potential
lawsuit. Again, this might be either through increased efforts at negotiation
or settlement, through defense with increased resources, through voluntary
dismissal of a taken case, or through inaction until the expiry of a statute of
limitations. Under current jurisprudence defining "taking" and "public
use," would any or all of these justifications pass constitutional muster?
A. "Taken"
First, there is of course a vast literature on what constitutes a "taking"
of property. 169  Much of this writing, however, focuses on parsing the
meaning of "taking" in the regulatory context; that is, identifying when a
regulation goes far enough that it will be analogous to a physical
167. Both settlement examples might be characterized as offensive or defensive, though this
is unimportant for the present discussion.
168. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489-90 (2005).
169. Merrill, supra note 9, at 891 & n.17 (collecting sources).
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appropriation of property. 17  Similarly, a typical analysis of whether
something has been "taken" might address whether regulation took place
under the state's harm-preventing police power. If so, the reasoning would
be that no property right has been "taken" and thus no compensation is
warranted. 171  Again, however, the present focus is on instances of actual
appropriation and transfer of ownership, so that determinations of how far
is "too far" can be set to the side.
172
Thus, in the naked transfer of ownership context, there is more clarity
than usual about whether property is being "taken." At least one important
context, though-particularly relevant to the seizure of a cause of action-
does implicate whether property has in fact been "taken": the use (if any) to
which the government subsequently puts the property. Again, I have
suggested that one thing the government might do with a seized cause of
action is nothing-simply not pursue the case or, subject to the rules of
procedure, voluntarily dismiss it. Thus, parsing the meaning of "taken"
here elides easily into an analysis of the use made (or not made) by the
government of the property in question.1
7 3
One commentator has argued along those lines, suggesting that the
focus of takings jurisprudence overall should be whether the government
puts the property seized to actual use. 174  Under this approach, if the
government does not in fact use the property in question, then no taking has
occurred for Takings Clause purposes. Professor Rubenfeld used this
approach both to advocate reconceptualizing takings doctrine, and to
explain discrepant findings in takings case law. For instance, he pointed
170. Cf Pa. Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) ("The general rule at least is, that while
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking.").
171. E.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. Benedectis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 n.20 (1987)
(holding that because "no individual has a right to use his lroperty so as to create a nuisance or
otherwise harm others, the State has not 'taken' anything when it asserts its power to enjoin the
nuisance-like activity").
172. Nor should overemphasis on actual physical seizure of an intangible, such as a cause of
action, be of concern. As noted above, intangibles-including choses in action-have long been
understood as within the ambit of the eminent domain power. See supra note 25 and
accompanying text. This broad reading of property subject to being taken leads to a broad
reading of the term "taken." Jeremy R. Polk, Comment, Compensation for the Fruit of the
Fund's Use: The Takings Clause and Tax Refunds, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 657, 673 n.92 (2004);
Andrew S. Gold, Regulatory Takings and Original Intent: The Direct, Physical Takings Thesis
"Goes Too Far, "49 AM. U. L. REv. 181, 189 (1999).
173. Cf Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1111 (1993) ("The dispositive question
in compensation doctrine should never have been, 'Has the state taken something from an
individual that qualifies as a fundamental deprivation?' It should have been, 'Has the state taken
somethingfor public use?"').
174. See generally id.
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out that the blighted cedar trees in Miller v. Schoene'75 were destroyed, not
used; therefore, even though the government clearly appropriated the
property, and clearly eliminated any viable economic use, there was no
taking. 7 6  More precisely, when the government in seizing property
77
takes advantage of the "use-rights" connected with particular property, then
that property has been taken. If those "use-rights" are not exploited-if,
for instance, the property is simply destroyed or not used-then no taking
has occurred. 178  He argues that this is both normatively 79  and
descriptively 80 the appropriate account of takings doctrine. Under this
account, the non-use of a cause of action-e.g., the voluntary dismissal of a
case, or the failure to pursue it until a statute of limitations expires-would
seem problematic.
Persuasive as Professor Rubenfeld's article is more generally,
however, the problem of non-use in this context seems illusory, for at least
four reasons. First, takings doctrine emphasizes that it is the injury to the
owner that makes something a taking (and that should be the measure of
just compensation).'18  Such focus on the owner's property loss suggests
that that injury is the better indicator of whether a taking occurred than
what is subsequently done with the property seized. Indeed, in United
States v. General Motors, Corp. the Supreme Court made this explicit,
noting that it is "the deprivation of the former owner rather than the
accretion of a right or interest to the sovereign [that] constitutes the
taking."'' 8 2  Second, it is clear that the obligation to compensate for a
seizure arises at the time of the government action or "invasion" of the
175. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
176. Rubenfeld, supra note 173, at 1113. Another example is United States v. Caltex
(Philippines), Inc., 344 U.S. 149 (1952), where soldiers deliberately destroyed a claimant's
property to prevent it from falling into enemy control. No taking was found, but the Court was
forced to distinguish precedent holding that military seizure of property for use was a
compensable taking. The Court distinguished between use and destruction; the former was a
taking, the latter-because of non-use-was not. Id. at 155.
177. Or regulating it; Rubenfeld's discussion is in the context of regulatory takings. See
Rubenfeld, supra note 173.
178. Id. at 1114-18.
179. Id. at 1162-63.
180. Id. at 1121 ("Takings by eminent domain almost invariably involve a state-planned use
of the taken property in precisely the sense that we defined above; the property is not merely
taken away, but used to lay a highway, build a dam, operate a post office, and so on." (emphasis
added)).
181. E.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946) (focusing on owner's loss of use
of land, rather than government's use); Boston Chamber of Comm. v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195
(1910) ("[T]he question is what has the owner lost, not what has the taker gained.").
182. United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945).
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property. 183 But a cause of action might be used or not, or pursued or not,
up until the end of the relevant statute of limitations period. 84 And under
Professor Rubenfeld's approach, it would be indeterminate whether the
cause of action will be used until that time. We would have to say,
therefore, that no taking occurred when the plaintiff was divested of his
property; rather, a taking would only occur when the government in fact
made some affirmative use of a cause of action. Apart from fairness issues,
this would seem inconsistent with existing doctrine as described above.'85
Moreover, at least under common law, there is no requirement that a
condemnor use the property for the stated public use within any specific
time period. 86  Third, there are a number of modern instances in which
land has been condemned by government bodies with the express purpose
of non-use. 187  Finally, in particular after Kelo, takings doctrine operates
under quite a deferential standard in determining what sort of "use" is
appropriate. 88  For all these reasons, I turn now to discussion of what
183. E.g., San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 654 (1981)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that the government's obligation arises "[a]s soon as private
property has been taken"); Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 284 (1939) (noting that just
compensation claim accrues "at the time of taking"); United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745,
751 (1946) (obligation to pay for land seized arose when the land was taken); Scott A. Keller,
Note, Judicial Jurisdiction Stripping Masquerading as Ripeness: Eliminating the Williamson
County State Litigation Requirement for Regulatory Takings Claims, 85 TEX. L. REV. 199, 216 &
n. 116 (2006) (noting that multiple cases hold that "a concrete injury arises when the appropriation
occurs" and collecting cases).
184. That is, the period in which the substantive claim could be brought.
185. Some reconciliation, perhaps, might come from Rubenfeld's emphasis on "use-rights,"
rather than simply on "use." He might suggest, for instance, that one way in which the use-rights
associated with a lawsuit may in fact be exploited would be to let the suit expire. If so, then
perhaps the taking would occur at the expiry of the statute of limitations. This reasoning,
however, seems inconsistent with the destruction examples Rubenfeld provides, in which
destroying property-analogous here to allowing a lawsuit to expire-does not lead to a taking.
See generally Rubenfeld, supra note 173.
186. Lynda J. Oswald, Can a Condemnee Regain Its Property if the Condemnor Abandons
the Public Use?, 39 URB. LAW. 671, 673 (2007).
187. See generally Lynda J. Oswald, Public Uses and Non-Uses: Sinister Schemes, Improper
Motives, and Bad Faith in Eminent Domain Law, 35 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 45 (2008).
188. In non-use cases where a condemnation was overturned, or where a court acknowledged
the possibility of overturning it, the basis seems not to be the specific fact of non-use, but rather
the apparent subterfuge in a condemnor stating that a particular public use was the goal of the
taking, though the actual purpose was to prevent an initial private use from occurring. E.g.,
Borough of Essex Falls v. Kessler Inst. for Rehab., 673 A.2d 856, 861 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1995) ("[W]here a condemnation is commenced for an apparently valid, stated purpose but the
real purpose is to prevent a proposed development which is considered undesirable, the
condemnation may be set aside."); In re Hewlett Bay Park, 265 N.Y.S.2d 1006 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1966), rev'd, 276 N.Y.S.2d 312 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966). Reviewing such cases, at least one
commentator views non-use as a legitimate purpose, so long as that non-use is clearly stated
initially (i.e., so long as no subterfuge exists). Oswald, supra note 187.
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constitutes "public use" and how that use connects with the taking of
causes of action.
B. "For Public Use"
The second part of an eminent domain analysis concerns whether
private property is being taken for a "public use." Of course, it is now
settled that "public use" is not limited to its narrow, literal meaning, nor
have any of a number of alternative interpretations been accepted.1 89 The
line of cases culminating in Kelo has made clear that when private property
is taken in order to provide some benefit for the public-that is, for some
justifiable "public purpose"-then the public use requirement will be
met.' 90 In determining whether a particular goal by the condemnor serves a
public purpose, courts will pay substantial deference to the legislative
decision-maker. 19' Kelo noted, however, and Justice Kennedy emphasized
in his concurrence, that in the context of transfers of condemned land to
other private parties, merely pretextual statements of public benefits will
not satisfy the Public Use Clause, where the taking's actual purpose would
189. Justice Thomas in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), and one state court
subscribe to the "narrow" view of public use, requiring literal "use" by members the public. Id. at
508-11 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Karesh v. City Council of City of Charleston, 247 S.E.2d
342, 344 (S.C. 1978) (adhering to a "strict interpretation" of the term); see Thomas W. Merrill,
The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 67 (1986) (explaining narrow test and
noting its virtually unanimous rejection). Kelo rejected an idea related to the narrow, literal test,
the suggestion that whether there is a literal use by the public or just a general purpose to serve
the public, it must indeed be the public's, rather than any private party's. Professor Rubenfeld's
emphasis on "use," rather than "public," also seems not to have persuaded courts. Two decades
ago, Professor Merrill reviewed other possible readings. For instance, quoting Hawaii Housing
Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984), he notes that "public use" may be "coterminous
with the scope of a sovereign's police power." Merrill, supra, at 70. If taken literally, he
suggested, that overlap might actually vitiate takings doctrine; a more plausible reading, he
suggested, is that "police power," and thus presumably the "public use" limitation, simply
reflected "the extent to which government may constitutionally regulate private activity." Id.
Another suggestion was put forth recently by David Dana, who suggested the notion that a
seizure of property must advance public welfare, or specifically, reduce concentration in poverty,
in order to satisfy the public use requirement. David A. Dana, Reforming Eminent Domain:
Unsupported Advocacy, Ambiguous Economics, and the Case for a New Public Use Test, 32 VT.
L. REV. 129 (2007).
190. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480 (2005) (noting that the Court has "repeatedly and consistently
rejected that narrow test"); Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241 (stating that the Public Use Clause is satisfied
if taking is "rationally related to a conceivable public purpose").
191. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480 ("Without exception, our cases have defined that concept broadly,
reflecting our longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments in this field."); Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) ("Congress and its authorized agencies have made determinations
that take into account a wide variety of values. It is not for us to reappraise them."); Midkiff, 467
U.S. at 241-42 (reaffirming deferential approach taken in Berman); see also Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, 1015 (1984) (paying deference to Congressional decision-making).
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be to confer a private benefit on a third party. 192 Of course, courts have
noted this restriction in the context of straightforward (i.e., non-transfer)
condemnation cases as well; in determining whether a taking is in fact in
the public interest, bad faith conduct by government officials-including
arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory conduct-may be considered. 1
93
Accordingly, as a doctrinal matter a government body will likely be
afforded broad latitude if it chooses to seize an individual's cause of action
for some public purpose, so long as there is a clear plan or explanation by
the condemning body as to what that public purpose is and how it will be
achieved. 194 A court will of course need to assess whether the seizure is
indeed for "public use"; in doing so, two concerns will likely be whether
the condemnation is simply pretextual (if ownership is transferred to a third
party), and whether use will actually be made of the seized cause of action.
In two of the suggested possible scenarios, a government body is
condemning a cause of action to use itself. This may be either to pursue
particular litigation on its own (offensive), or to prevent a suit against itself
192. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 478 ("Nor would the City be allowed to take property under the mere
pretext of a public purpose, when its actual purpose was to bestow a private benefit."); id. at 490-
91 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see generally 49 WB, LLC v. Vill. of Haverstraw, 839 N.Y.S.2d
127 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (holding that the record did not support Village's claims that proposed
condemnation served public purpose); Franco v. Nat'l Capital Revitalization Corp., 930 A.2d
160, 172 (D.C. App. 2007) (remanding to trial court for determination of whether stated purpose
was pretextual).
193. E.g., Shaikh v. City of Chi., 341 F.3d 627, 632-33 (7th Cir. 2003) ("The public use
protections would resolve Shaikh's concerns that Chicago was not motivated to take his property
for the stated intention of relocating the Kennedy-King campus but rather by unlawful,
discriminatory animus."); United States v. 58.16 Acres of Land, 478 F.2d 1055, 1060 (7th Cir.
1973); (observing that allegations of bad faith, arbitrariness, and capriciousness in the exercise of
the eminent-domain power all bear upon the public use determination); U.S. Dep't of the Interior
v. 16.03 Acres of Land, 26 F.3d 349, 356 (2d Cir. 1994) ("[A] reviewing court may only set aside
a takings decision as being arbitrary, capricious, or undertaken in bad faith in those instances
where the court finds the Secretary's conduct so egregious that the taking at issue can serve no
public use."); United States v. 397.51 Acres of Land, 692 F.2d 688, 692 (10th Cir. 1982) ("In the
absence of bad faith, a condemnation for a public use is a matter for the legislative branch and not
open to judicial determination."); see generally Oswald, supra note 187. But see Mount Laurel
Twp. v. Mipro Homes, L.L.C., 878 A.2d 38, 50 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) ("[T]his case is
governed by the general rule that '[clourts will generally not inquire into a public body's motive
concerning the necessity of the taking or the amount of property to be appropriated for public
use."' (citation omitted)).
194. E.g., Middletown Twp. v. Lands of Stone, 939 A.2d 331, 338 (Pa. 2007) ("[E]vidence of
a well-developed plan of proper scope is significant proof that an authorized purpose truly
motivates a taking"). One difference is that plans of the sort in Stone, Kelo, and other cases
typically involve pre-established plans related to land development. Though such plans may be
abstract or non-specific, they are at least likely to already be in place before the relevant
condemnation occurs. In the case of causes of action, such established plans would be rarer,
given the lower probability of predicting lawsuits. The condemnor will still have to set out some
persuasive legitimate explanation.
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or another party (defensive). In the other two scenarios, the condemned
cause of action is then transferred to another private party.
First, a government body may believe that it is better equipped or
motivated to pursue a particular cause of action than the action's initial
holder, and that a successful outcome to the particular litigation would be
of public benefit. Pursuing litigation against tobacco companies, foreign
institutions, or other parties with substantial resources are possible
examples where the action's initial holder might have fewer resources and
thus be precluded from effectively pursuing the litigation. The government
body would need to show that the outcome of the litigation would generate
public benefit, perhaps in the form of a substantial damages award or a
substantive legal ruling in the action that, the government body argues, is
favorable to the public welfare (new limits on tobacco advertising, perhaps,
or some symbolic admission by an institution that vindicates the interests of
a particular minority group). Similarly, the cause of action might be
condemned and then transferred to a third party. Here, the same public
purpose analysis is necessary, and, again, the government body might argue
that the condemnation is being undertaken in order to pursue litigation
more effectively. This might be accomplished by giving the lawsuit to a
party with better resources than the initial plaintiff. The recipient party
might also be better positioned or motivated to pursue some sort of impact
or advocacy litigation.
On the other hand, a government body might also condemn a lawsuit
that it views as having the possibility of a substantial award explicitly in
order to pursue that award. Seen this way, the government body might be
seen as taking advantage of those better resources simply to pursue a
windfall judgment. It might do something similar by giving an action with
the possibility of a large award to another private party.
Alternatively, the government body might act defensively and
condemn an action being brought against it, one of its agents, or even
another third party. For instance, John Doe might bring a § 1983 action
against a police official or a suit against a municipality. Doe refuses a
settlement, and the relevant municipality (or other government body)
predicts liability and a large damage award. In order to ensure that liability
does not attach, that government body condemns Doe's action. Here,
obviously, although pursuing the case or a settlement is conceivable
(perhaps with a substantially smaller award being requested), the likelier
alternative is for the new government owner of the suit to voluntarily
dismiss the action or wait until the statute of limitations has expired. 19'
195. Odd as it may appear, it is probably not a fatal concern that the condemnation may place
the government body in the position of suing itself. In United States v. Interstate Commerce
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Similarly, the action might be condemned and transferred to a third party
under the same reasoning. Does such "defensive" conduct satisfy the
public use requirement?
Plausibly, depending perhaps on the amount of damages foreseen, or,
again, on the predicted legal outcome of the action. A substantial damage
award might entail a serious drain on the public fisc, and the government
body might make a legitimate case that such a budgetary depletion would
have repercussions for subsequently available public services. 196  Other
areas have seen general approbation of the use of eminent domain to
prevent such economic consequences-not the usual economic
development case, but rather to prevent negative local economic
consequences. As the leading treatise on eminent domain points out, for
instance, eminent domain in the case of businesses, industries, or sports
franchises that might close or relocate, may be a valid public use.,
9 7
Combining this reasoning with the deference typically paid to government
actors in this context suggests that such a condemnation, with the goal of
protecting the public fisc, could satisfy the public use prong. Another
possibility would be some substantive outcome that, the government body
argues, should be prevented because of some negative effect on the public
welfare.
When the seizure is for defensive purposes, however, the scenarios
raise additional questions of pretext.' 98  Implicit in Kelo, and explicit in
Justice Kennedy's concurrence, is the idea that despite the deference to be
Commission, 337 U.S. 426 (1949), the Supreme Court was faced with an instance of the United
States bringing an action in federal district court to set aside a particular order by the Interstate
Commerce Commission ("ICC") concerning conduct by certain railroads. By relevant statute,
any action for such relief was to include the United States as a defendant; accordingly, the United
States appeared as both plaintiff and defendant. Although the Court recognized the well-
established principle that no person can sue himself, it held that this was not an impediment to the
case in question. The Court noted that the case "involve[d] controversies of a type that are
traditionally justiciable," specifically, whether the ICC's order was validly enacted and whether
the railroads had improperly "exacted sums of money from the United States." Jd. at 430. The
presence of this justiciable issue made it appropriate for the court to "look behind [the] names that
symbolize the parties" and address the substantive issues involved. Id. Similarly, a condemned
lawsuit would likely still raise justiciable, substantive liability issues, and for that reason might be
appropriate to continue despite the potential appearance of the government body on both sides of
the "v."
196. See Beermann, supra note 20, at 321 n.179 ("Protecting the public purse from tort
claims is obviously a public purpose.").
197. 8A SACKMAN ET AL., supra note 43, § G22.02(1) (citing City of Oakland v. Oakland
Raiders, 646 P.2d 835 (Cal. 1982)).
198. Such questions also arise in the offensive context, where the apparent purpose of the
condemnation is simply to pursue litigation with the goal of a favorable monetary outcome. In
that instance they might be framed as whether the condemnation decision was arbitrary,
capricious, or discriminatory. See cases cited supra note 193.
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afforded the decision-making body, courts should nevertheless assess
whether the transfer from one private property owner to another by means
of eminent domain is not for a public purpose, but rather simply to benefit
that recipient. Courts are beginning to make such assessments, at times
holding that the claimed purpose is simply pretextual.' 99 Of course, the
determination will be heavily fact-dependent. In the context of the
condemnation of a cause of action, evaluation would likely entail
examination of the specific explanation given by the government body, to
evaluate whether the goal is "legitimate" and the means are "not irrational"
to achieving it. z00 I speculate that this analysis will usually tip in the
government's favor and, to the extent the goal is evaluated, the court would
likely defer to the government body's reasonable assessment of the likely
monetary or substantive outcome. Moreover, to the extent that the means
must be evaluated, a court will be unlikely to second-guess particular
litigation strategies that the government body claims will achieve its ends.
A second point that might arise involves the actual use or non-use of
the legal claim. This has already been addressed in part above in
discussing Professor Rubenfeld's article.20  However, in light of recent
legislative reforms, the further question arises whether non-use by the
condemnor might afford the opportunity for the condemnee to recover its
property, i.e., the legal claim or cause of action.20 2
Again, at common law, little constraint is placed on the time in which
a condemnor must initiate the public use for which property was
condemned. °3 By statute, however, some states provide that if such use is
not initiated in a certain number of years, the condemnee may repurchase
the property, either at fair market value, 204 at the condemnation price,205 or
by matching the highest bid at public auction.20 6 Since Kelo, such
provisions have increased, both at the constitutional and legislative level,
typically providing that if condemned property is not used, or is not used
199. E.g., 49 WB, LLC v. Vill. of Haverstraw, 839 N.Y.S.2d 127 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007)
(holding that the record did not support Village's claims that the proposed condemnation served a
public purpose); Franco v. Nat'l Capital Revitalization Corp., 930 A.2d 160 (D.C. App. 2007)
(remanding to trial court for determination of whether stated purpose was pretextual).
200. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 488 (2005) (citation omitted).
201. Seesupra notes 173-88.
202. See Oswald, supra note 186.
203. See id.
204. E.g., TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 21.103 (2008); N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW § 406(A)
(2008) (applies to unimproved land); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 498-A:12(1) (2008) (applies to
unimproved land).
205. E.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 416.670(1) (2008).
206. E.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-30-321(1) (2008).
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for the originally stated purpose, the condemnee may repurchase the
property, either at the condemnation price or at fair market value.20 7 Some
of these reforms go specifically to the Kelo situation of transferring
condemned property to another private party. For instance, some states
now prohibit such transfer of condemned property outright, but some
prohibit such transfer when the property is unused unless the condemnee is
given the opportunity to repurchase.20 8
Such provisions potentially improve the position of condemnees
whose legal claims may have been seized, especially where the purpose of
the seizure was to allow the statute of limitations for a legal claim to expire
or to transfer to a third party. At least two caveats exist, however. First, as
implied above, it is not necessarily clear that failure to pursue a legal claim
must in fact constitute "non-use. There may be plausible strategic
reasons for not engaging in particular litigation activity, and a court may be
unwilling to directly second-guess such strategy.21° Of course, the more it
becomes apparent that no activity is contemplated, the more likely a court
may be to take a hard look at the government body's conduct, but what
activity a condemnor would need to engage in to avoid such scrutiny is
likely an open question. Moreover, a condemnor (or transferee) might
voluntarily dismiss the suit. Although the outcome is the same, should
both tactics be characterized as "non-use?" Second, the time the
condemnor has before the condemnee may repurchase might conceivably
be longer than the relevant statute of limitation for the underlying
substantive claim that was taken. If so, the condemnee is hardly helped by
the buyback opportunity.
III. "Just Compensation"
When private property is taken for public use, just compensation is
constitutionally mandated.21' Unsurprisingly, however, determining what
compensation might qualify as "just" can lead to substantial difficulty.
212
When the underlying property being taken is a cause of action, that
207. Oswald, supra note 186, at 677-80.
208. E.g., ALA. CODE §§ 11-47-170(c), 11-80-1(c) (2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1-2(c) (2008).
209. Seesupra notes 173-88.
210. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
211. U.S. CONST. amend. V; Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank
of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985) ("The Fifth Amendment does not proscribe the taking
of property; it proscribes taking without just compensation." (citing Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining
& Reclamation Ass'n., 452 U.S. 264, 297 n.40 (1980))).
212. DANA & MERRILL, supra note 1, at 169 (noting that the compensation issue is the most
frequently litigated of the Takings Clause issues).
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difficulty can only increase because of the associated problems of defining
and valuing that cause of action.
Ordinarily, to avoid the difficulties likely to arise in the valuation of a
taken asset, courts rely primarily on the "fair market value" ("FMV") being
taken as the measure of just compensation-that is, what a willing buyer
would pay in cash to a willing seller at the time the property is seized.'
1 3
With the goal of increasing the certainty of arriving at a clear value for the
property,214  intangible value such as sentimental attachment or
demoralization costs, as well as consequential damages such as attorney
fees, lost profits, moving costs, or lost business good will, are typically
excluded from consideration,2t 5 though these may be awarded under certain
statutory regimes.216 Using FMV as the benchmark for just compensation
is well-established,217 as are certain associated principles: Compensation
should reflect the value that the erstwhile owner has lost, not what the new
government owner has obtained; 218 the owner should be placed "in as good
a position pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken"; 219 and
compensation should reflect the value of the property at the time of the
taking, although reasonably possible or reasonably probable future uses of
the property may be taken into account. 220  Market value is typically not
used, however, when that value would be too difficult to ascertain, or when
213. E.g., Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 243-44 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 81 (1913).
Further, in the real property context, FMV might be evaluated through at least three different
methods: comparable sales, income capitalization, or reproduction or replacement cost. Michael
DeBow, Unjust Compensation: The Continuing Need for Reform, 46 S.C. L. REV. 579, 581-82
(1995); see also Kwall, supra note 31, at 718-21 (discussing alternative means courts have used
to calculate just compensation).
214. United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979) ("Because of serious
practical difficulties in assessing the worth an individual places on particular property at a given
time, we have recognized the need for a relatively objective working rule.").
215. E.g., Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5 (1949) (noting that values
stemming from "idiosyncratic attachment" not to be considered); United States v. Petty Motor
Co., 327 U.S. 372, 377-78 (1946).
216. See, e.g., Katrina Miriam Wyman, The Measure of Just Compensation, 41 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 239, 255 (2007). There has also been recent movement, spurred largely by Kelo, to
reform states' compensation practices by awarding compensation for intangible losses. Id. at 257
& n.61.
217. E.g., Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. at 377.
218. Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910) ("[T]he question is,
what has the owner lost, not, what has the taker gained.").
219. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934); United States v. 564.54 Acres of
Land, 441 U.S. 506,511 (1979).
220. United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 29 (1984); Olson, 292 U.S. at 256-57.
Cf Kupchak et al., supra note 156, at 23 ("[J]ust compensation in this context must include fair
market value of the property in its fully entitled state." (emphasis added)).
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paying FMV would somehow result in a "manifest injustice" to the owner
or to the public.22" '
What is the value of a lawsuit? What is its FMV? Despite the calls
reviewed earlier for markets in legal claims, it is difficult to ascertain the
fair market value of a cause of action, and, therefore, difficult to determine
the appropriate measure of just compensation when a legal claim is taken
for public use. This difficulty arises for at least four reasons. First, of
course, is the absence of a robust market. Second, there is some scholarly
dispute over whether to characterize a lawsuit as an asset or as a real
option. Third, there may be dispute over what exactly is being taken: the
cause of action, the lawsuit, the remedy or judgment associated with that
action, or the right to sue itself. Fourth, non-economic or intangible
considerations may be present, and some recent statutory reforms suggest
that they should be considered.
A. Valuation in the Absence of a Market
An immediate sticking point is the absence of a robust market for
legal claims, and in particular, tort-based claims. Although inalienability
need not mean that the underlying asset is not "property," it does render it
difficult to value that asset, especially, of course, given the emphasis placed
on FMV. As Merrill has pointed out, "the constitutional right protected by
the Takings Clause is the right to just compensation. Just compensation, in
turn, is ordinarily measured by market value. This means that the rights
protected by the Takings Clause tend to be those that are bought and sold in
the market.,
222
As suggested above, however, it is not unusual for courts to use an
alternative approach to FMV when necessary, either where assessing value
is difficult or where there is no robust market for the good.22 3 Following
his comment above, Merrill notes that in such cases, a property right should
nevertheless be compensated if the right is "otherwise susceptible to
221. Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 10 n.14 (1984) (citations omitted);
Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 243-44 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Some
courts apply FMV even when such determination is quite difficult to ascertain. E.g., Estate of
Smith v. Comm'r, 198 F.3d 515, 529 n.61 (5th Cir. 1999) ("We have held, however, that the
willing buyer-willing seller method applies to all questions of valuation, even when, as a realistic
matter, the subject property might not be sold or assigned at all.").
222. Merrill, supra note 9, at 957 (footnotes omitted).
223. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 6 (1949) ("[R]ecourse must be had to
other means of ascertaining value, including even value to the owner as indicative of value to
other potential owners enjoying the same rights."); see also Chaplin v. Hicks, 2 K.B. 786, 792
(1911) ("Sometimes, however, there is no market for the particular class of goods; but no one has
ever suggested that, because there is no market, there are no damages.").
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monetary valuation on some objective basis., 224 Elsewhere he has made a
similar argument, in the interesting context of the propriety of condemning
a business's right to advertise. In particular, he argues that a liability
rule-i.e., susceptibility to a taking by the government with a court's
determination of damages-is appropriate when
(1) the rightsholder has a monopoly over something the government
needs to acquire to fulfill its objectives; (2) compensation rather than
police power is appropriate, either because the rightsholder is
blameless or because the rightsholder has already been determined to
have a constitutionally protected right; and (3) the right in question
225can be objectively valued in monetary terms.
Here, as sketched in Section I, the holder of a cause of action has a
constitutionally protected property interest in that cause of action, one that
only he can use, and is certainly "blameless" in Merrill's sense (prongs one
and two). Again, however, in order for compensation to be appropriate,
can that interest be valued, especially in the absence of a market?
The most straightforward way to value the lawsuit would be simply to
look at the damages requested. This has the appeal of, to some extent,
reflecting the value the rightsholder has placed on the action, and thus is
some indication of what the owner has lost.226 It also reflects a line of
reasoning from the land development context, in which the appropriate
compensation is seen as the value of the land in its developed state (i.e.,
once the property interest has reached its full fruition).227 An analogous
approach, avoiding the subjectivity of simply the plaintiffs valuation,
would be the full, objectively determined value of a successful suit.
Although these approaches have the value of consistency with the
development context, they obviously ignore the contingent nature of a
lawsuit. It is not certain that the plaintiff will succeed in his suit, and the
value of the suit should take that element of chance into account. Thus, the
traditional approach to defining the value of a lawsuit, used typically for
settlement purposes, focuses on its "expected value," which multiplies the
224. Merrill, supra note 9, at 957 n.270.
225. Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitution and the Cathedral. Prohibiting, Purchasing, and
Possibly Condemning Tobacco Advertising, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 1143, 1199 (1999).
226. The approach is not unheard of, especially to the extent the property in question is
unique. See, e.g., King v. United States, 292 F. Supp. 767, 777 (D. Colo. 1968).
227. Kupchak et al., supra note 156, at 23 ("[J]ust compensation in this context must include
fair market value of the property in its fully entitled state." (emphasis added)).
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expected value of the judgment by the probability of a successful claim.22 8
Legal fees may be included in the calculus, with transaction and other
additional costs potentially being considered as well.229
In fact, courts in other contexts do take something like this approach
when faced with the necessity of placing a value on lawsuits. In estate law,
for instance, when someone dies with a lawsuit pending, courts must place
a value on that suit, typically for tax purposes. 230 Less directly analogous,
in attorney malpractice suits, a plaintiff must show that there was a viable
underlying cause of action, and that his attorney's negligent treatment of
that action proximately caused him damage.23 t In determining a plaintiffs
actual losses for such an action, the value of that underlying action is
assessed.232
But despite such seemingly straightforward valuation processes, at
least two other problems arise in trying to determine how to value the
lawsuit in question. The first is whether to apply that traditional model of
pricing in the first place. If that approach is not taken, then the further
concern arises whether to characterize the underlying suit as an asset, or as
a real option. Each characterization leads to a different valuation
method.233 The second issue concerns what exactly is being taken when the
government condemns either a cause of action or the associated lawsuit.
234
B. What is Being Valued?
1. Valuation as an Asset or as an Option?
Recent commentators have criticized the traditional "expected-value"
model of valuing a lawsuit. Such criticism, however, has taken quite
228. See Grundfest & Huang, supra note 164, at 1280; Rhee, supra note 164, at 200-01;
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J.
LEGAL STUD. 399, 418 (1973).
229. Posner, supra note 228, at 418.
230. See, e.g., Estate of Smith v. Comm'r, 198 F.3d 515 (5th Cir. 1999). Cf Matter of Estate
of Davis, 524 N.W.2d 125, 128 (S.D. 1994) ("We agree that the value of a cause of action as of
the date of death, not its future proceeds, is what should be assessed for inheritance tax purposes."
(citation omitted)); Estate of Davis v. Comm'r, 65 T.C.M (CCH) 2365 (1993) (calculating value
of lawsuit).
231. E.g., Kituskie v. Corbman, 714 A.2d 1027, 1030 (Pa. 1998).
232. See, e.g., 7A C.J.S. Attorney & Client § 335 (2007) ("[T]he injuries resulting from legal
malpractice are not personal injuries but, instead, are pecuniary injuries to intangible property
interests." quoting Coregis Ins. Co. v. Schuster, 127 F. Supp. 2d 683, 686-87 (E.D. Pa. 2001)
(citations omitted)).
233. Compare Grundfest & Huang, supra note 164, with Rhee, supra note 164. See also
Peter H. Huang, Lawsuit Abandonment Options in Possibly Frivolous Litigation Games, 23 REV.
LITIG. 47, 56 (2004).
234. See supra notes 150-58 for more discussion of the distinction's import.
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different perspectives, and leads to quite different valuation outcomes.
Grundfest and Huang, for instance, emphasize that a lawsuit is a series of
choices and decisions regarding an underlying asset; as such, it is
essentially a real option235 and can be valued according to option theory.
236
Under this approach, uncertainty or risk involved in the underlying asset in
fact increases the value of the option,237 in part because of the opportunity
to retain flexibility in decision-making 238 and in part because of additional
information that might become available while no action is taken.239
Accordingly, if a legal claim is seen as a real option, the potential decisions
a plaintiff might take at different stages of the litigation process might be
modeled and valued; Grundfest and Huang describe some ways to do so.
240
Rhee's asset pricing argument disagrees with their approach. In part,
he makes a sharper distinction than do Grundfest and Huang between the
procedural right to sue and the underlying substantive claim (this issue is
taken up in more detail in the next subsection). 241 This distinction suggests
that although the procedural right to bring suit may plausibly be thought of
as a real option, that option only derives its value from the underlying
substantive dispute. Indeed, he argues, being distinct from the asset from
235. A real option is an option (i.6., the right to take some action in the future) that is tied to a
particular underlying asset.
236. Grundfest & Huang, supra note 164; see also Huang, supra note 65, at 1955 ("[A]
lawsuit actually involves a series of call options.").
237. E.g., Grundfest & Huang, supra note 164; Thomas A. Smith, Real Options and
Takeovers, 52 EMORY L.J. 1815, 1819 (2003) (noting that other things being equal, the "more
volatile the underlying asset, the more valuable the option"); Rhee, supra note 164, at 196; Daniel
Corrigan, Real Option Theory and its Uses in Legal Thought 10 (Apr. 20, 2005) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
238. E.g., Mark Klock, Financial Options, Real Options, and Legal Options: Opting to
Exploit Ourselves and What We Can Do About It, 55 ALA. L. REV. 63, 71 (2003).
239. Corrigan, supra note 237, at 22.
240. In particular, they note that
[litigation] operates through a well-defined sequence of events. Litigation is, in this
respect, better defined than many other investment projects. The likely range of
outcomes at each stage of the litigation process is also relatively well defined and is
usually bounded in terms of a best and worst possible outcome. Experienced counsel
can generally provide reasoned estimates of the distribution of these outcomes at each
stage of the process. Indeed, even if counsel lack the experience necessary to generate
such estimates, the models can be constructed using the equal ignorance assumption
and can be subjected to sensitivity analyses designed to test whether and how various
assumptions regarding the model's parameterization influence the lawsuit's potential
settlement value. Computationally, because lawsuits typically involve a finite number
of key decision points, standard binomial lattice approaches to the valuation of real
options will be particularly well suited to the calculation of litigation options settlement
values.
Grundfest & Huang, supra note 164, at 1327. See Huang, supra note 65, at 1958 for a related
article with more specific examples.
241. Rhee, supra note 164, at 196.
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which it derives its value, an option cannot generate its own value. As
such, "[A] lawsuit is fundamentally an asset that generates a future,
uncertain cashflow. Asset pricing principles must govern its valuation. 242
In other words, according to Rhee, although the decision tree concerning
litigation choices does suggest thinking in terms of a real option, that does
not eliminate the fact that the underlying lawsuit is the asset that is to be
valued.
2. What is Being Taken?
Rhee is correct to distinguish between the right to sue and the
underlying lawsuit, as I did earlier (and which distinction Grundfest and
Huang do not reject). This distinction, however, raises a second valuation
question: what exactly is being subjected to condemnation? That is, what
we might see the condemnor to be seizing is not the lawsuit, but rather the
right to sue itself. This would be so if the seizure occurred after an injury
but before a suit is actually filed. Alternatively, even if the lawsuit has
been filed, we might analogize to compensation for the value of an asset,
rather than what the owner might do with that asset (i.e., analogous to the
justification for receiving fair market value rather than full development
potential). That analogy might justify viewing the property to be valued as
the right to sue, rather than the lawsuit.
Indeed, the value of the right to sue is almost certainly different from
that of the underlying suit.243 For instance, before a suit is filed, and even
more so after it is filed, it acquires some settlement value, even if the
underlying action is frivolous.2 4  But how should the right to sue be
valued? If FMV is to be used-i.e., what a willing buyer would pay a
willing seller-how is a buyer likely to place a value on that right, other
than the conventional expected value or real option approaches discussed
above? How can the price (and thus just compensation) be determined
unless the right to sue is itself specifically valuated or commodified?
One initial attempt at quantifying that value comes from scholars in
the Netherlands, developing working groups and research on measuring the
costs of "access to justice.' 245 Their projects seek to measure the "costs of
242. Id. at 223-24.
243. See id. at 212 ("[T]he value of a lawsuit has two parts: ... the value of the underlying
right that is the basis of the claim of injury, and.., the procedural right to opt for trial.").
244. Huang, supra note 233.
245. See Maurits Barendrecht et al., How to Measure the Price and Quality of Access to
Justice? (Nov. 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); MEASURING ACCESS TO




LEGAL CLAIMS AS PRIVATE PROPERTY
justice" and barriers to accessing justice, incorporating the costs to all
parties involved of pursuing legal claims. A useful aspect of their approach
is the recognition that such "costs are not merely measured in terms of
money, but also in terms of time and emotional costs (e.g., stress). 246 The
problem with their model, however, is that it collapses (understandably)
back into an analysis of the costs of a lawsuit, rather than somehow
quantifying the value of the right to sue-i.e., the right to "access
,,247justice.
An alternative to this approach, focusing explicitly on the value of the
right to sue, might consider the First Amendment or other cases brought for
248the denial of access to court. If monetary relief were awarded in such
cases, it might give some rough idea of how to value the right to sue itself.
Such access cases typically fall into one of three categories: forward-
looking, retaliation, or backward-looking. 249 Forward-looking cases occur
when certain impediments, such as filing fees, effectively deny an
individual access to the courts. Retaliation cases occur when a government
actor retaliated against an individual for filing a claim. Backward-looking
cases tend to occur when government action impedes a claim or potential
claim, which may involve government "cover-ups," destruction of
evidence, or police misconduct. Of these three types, forward-looking
claims seem least analogous, as they occur when some official action
temporarily denies some class of plaintiffs the opportunity to litigate; that
is, where that opportunity "has not been lost for all time,.., but only in the
short tenn."25 The goal of the denial of access action is thus to remove the
"frustrating condition" of the official action and recover the opportunity to
litigate.25" '
Both retaliation and backward-looking claims, however, support the
idea of a distinct value for the right to sue, as reflected in damage awards
for the loss of access to courts. In Silver v. Cornier, for instance, a
retaliation case, the court upheld an award of punitive damages in a § 1983
claim that the defendant, a state official, threatened to withhold legally
246. Barendrecht et al., supra note 245, at 5.
247. Id. at 14 tbl. 1 (describing multiple costs that might enter into pursuing a legal claim).
248. The relevant cases, of course, would be those in which a plaintiff is inappropriately
prevented from pursuing a legal claim at all, not simply, for instance, where physical barriers
might exist to literally accessing a courthouse. See Swekel v. City of River Rouge, 119 F.3d
1259, 1262 (6th Cir. 1997) (noting that access to courts protects more than physical access, but
also effective and meaningful access).
249. Una A. Kim, Note, Government Corruption and the Right of Access to Courts, 103
MICH. L. REV. 554, 562 (2004).
250. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 413 (2002).
251. Id.
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required payments if the plaintiff exercised his right to access the court.
252
Recourse under § 1983 seems the accepted approach in vindicating the
right to access in these retaliation cases.253 It is not clear, however, whether
these § 1983 cases place a value on the damage caused by the retaliation, or
rather measure damages by the value of the underlying case that was
precluded from being brought. Silver, for instance, upheld the award of
punitive damages even in the "absence of actual loss.
' 254
The backward-looking cases seem equally applicable, as they look to
vindicate "not the judgment in a further lawsuit, but simply the judgment in
the access claim itself, in providing relief obtainable in no other suit in the
future. '255  However, like the retaliation cases, they are also somewhat
unclear, at least in terms of giving guidance for valuing the right to sue.
Although almost all circuits to visit the issue agree that a cause of action
exists for such a claim, 256 most claims have been dismissed on various
grounds, such as the availability of an alternative forum, 257 plaintiff's
failure to state an appropriate claim,258 or plaintiffs attempt to litigate the
underlying cause of action prior to his denial of access claim. 259 Thus,
although courts recognize this sort of claim in the abstract, in practice they
are of less help in placing some value on the right to sue.
Finally, however, returning to real option theory may provide
direction for making these valuations. Recall the emphasis there-and,
especially, in the critique of the theory-on the distinction between the
procedural right to sue and the substantive underlying claim.26° Both
approaches seem to agree that option theory may be an appropriate means
of valuing the procedural right; the disagreement focuses on whether it is a
sensible way to value the underlying right. If that is so, then real option
theory and its established valuation formulae may yield useful insights for
determining the value of the right to sue, and thus for determining what
252. Silver v. Cormier, 529 F.2d 161, 163 (10th Cir. 1976).
253. See Harrison v. Springdale Water & Sewer Comm'n, 780 F.2d 1422, 1426 (8th Cir.
1986); Valot v. Se. Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 107 F.3d 1220, 1225 (6th Cir. 1997); Ringsred
v. City of Duluth, 187 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1157 (D. Minn. 2001). The determination of damages
under § 1983 is typically for a jury. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.,
526 U.S. 687, 709-10 (1999).
254. Silver, 529 F.2d at 163.
255. Harbury, 536 U.S. at 414.
256. Kim, supra note 249, at 576.
257. E.g., Delew v. Wagner, 143 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 1998).
258. E.g., Harbury, 536 U.S. at 421.
259. E.g., Swekel v. City of River Rouge, 119 F.3d 1259, 1264 (6th Cir. 1997).
260. See supra notes 240-42.
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constitutes just compensation when that right is condemned through
eminent domain.
C. Non-Economic Factors
One final consideration is the non-economic factors, whether
perceived or objective, that might affect the value of the lawsuit. Again, in
the wake of the Supreme Court's Kelo decision, states are turning towards
allowing compensation for intangible losses. 261 Although it may at first
blush seem incongruous to consider, for instance, sentimental attachment to
a lawsuit-unlike attachment to land or a house-it is not unlikely that a
plaintiff may experience the "warm glow of ownership" associated with the
"endowment effect," placing a higher value on a lawsuit simply because he
owns or controls it.262 The endowment effect, however, is often seen as a
bias or error in judgment, and such subjective valuation is unlikely to factor
into a calculation of just compensation.263  Perhaps more plausible
intangible factors to consider would include the "demoralization costs"
discussed by Frank Michelman, which include the psychological harm
caused by losses uncompensated by purely objective measures; 264 or the
loss of the opportunity for a "day in court" or to express one's "voice,"
factors integral to notions of procedural justice. 265  Finally, commentators
have noted the close relationship between lawsuits and personal dignity and
integrity, in particular in the context of Margaret Radin's property as
personhood theory.266 Although Professor Abramowicz points out some
conceptual problems with the notion of defining one's identity in terms of a
261. See Wyman, supra note 216, at 257 & n.61.
262. See Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Emotional Paternalism, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2007)
(using the "warm glow" term and discussing endowment effect). For discussions of the
endowment effect see id.; Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect
and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990); Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect
and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1227 (2003).
263. Whether this is an appropriate characterization, and whether as a normative matter it
should be taken into account, is another question.
264. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation Law, " 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967).
265. E.g., Frank B. Cross, In Praise of Irrational Plaintiffs, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 19 (2000)
(noting that the most frequently cited objective of lay litigants in adjudicatory proceedings was to
"tell my side of the story" (citation omitted) (quotation marks omitted)); Roy D. Simon, Jr., The
Riddle of Rule 68, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 63 (1985) (noting that even when settling a lawsuit
would be more favorable than a trial outcome, plaintiffs may want to feel that they have had their
"day in court").
266. Abramowicz, supra note 78, at 706-11; see Margaret J. Radin, Market-Inalienability,
100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987). Professor Abramowicz's discussion focuses on whether
Radin's personhood theory should render legal claims inalienable, ultimately concluding that it
should not. Abramowicz, supra, at 711.
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lawsuit, it is certainly plausible that a plaintiff's goal in filing suit,
especially a tort action, is to restore personal dignity and integrity. Placing
a value on such intangibles is of course difficult, but to the extent statutory
reform allows consideration of such intangibles, 67 they may be factors to
consider in the just compensation context.
Indeed, there are hints in takings jurisprudence that this may even be
mandated in such circumstances. In Kimball Laundry Co. v. United
States,268 the U.S. Supreme Court held that where the government had
entirely appropriated a business to use itself, albeit temporarily, just
compensation had to include the value of less tangible factors. At least one
commentator has drawn attention to the value of the loss of autonomy
attendant on the condemnation of property,269 and it is plausible that such
loss would be as great or greater in the context of the loss of a lawsuit.
D. Summary
When an individual's cause of action is taken by the government for
public use, just compensation is mandated. The easiest means to calculate
such compensation is likely the conventional approach to valuing lawsuits,
involving an assessment of the potential award, discounted by the
likelihood of success and incorporating other costs such as attorneys' fees.
A case, however, can be made for treating a cause of action as a real option
and valuing it according to well-established means of treating such options.
Other factors might be taken into account as well. Again, the most
straightforward way to view such a seizure is that the lawsuit itself is being
taken, and either the asset or option approach is appropriate. But an
alternative account views the target of the seizure as the right to sue itself;
if so, an alternative means of valuation, perhaps through real option
pricing, is necessary. Finally, recent reforms might warrant the
consideration of intangible, non-economic, consequential, and other non-
FMV costs.
Summary and Conclusion
The government may exercise its power of eminent domain to
condemn the legal claims of private citizens, either for its own use or, with
some qualifications, for transfer to another private party. Consistent with
267. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
268. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 15, 15-16 (1949).
269. Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REv. 957; Lee
Anne Fennell, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 105 MICH. L. REv. 101
(2006).
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straightforward application of eminent domain law, the condemnation must
be for public use and just compensation must be given to the condemnee.
Whether government bodies should undertake such conduct is, of
course, an entirely different question.270  As in other areas, government
actors should take into account the costs and benefits of their actions.27'
Economic costs and benefits clearly must be considered, assessing whether
the cost of just compensation and potential litigation costs are outweighed
by the potential financial gains of the lawsuit.272 Just as clearly, another
critical cost to consider will be public reaction. Given the public outcry
over Kelo and similar eminent domain cases, such reaction might be quite
strong where a government body is perceived to be removing something of
personal value from a private citizen, a vindicatory right to which that
citizen might be strongly attached. Further, a perception that government
bodies might step in defensively to prevent a suit against itself or another
defendant, especially if based on repeated conduct by the government, may
reduce trust in the government; it may also deter private citizens from
initiating litigation for fear of "losing" their right to sue or their actual
claim. 273 Similarly, public perceptions would likely also be negative when
a lawsuit is condemned but then not "used"-i.e., if the statute of
limitations were allowed to expire.
However, the public may react more favorably where the government
condemns a legal claim in order to pursue it for reasons perceived to be in
the public interest-again, the tobacco litigation or foreign institution
examples above might reflect such a perception. Alternatively, given the
public perception that plaintiffs are overly litigious, a sense that
government is stepping in to protect society against frivolous lawsuits
might emerge. Clearly, empirical research as to public perceptions of such
government conduct, both the propriety of such seizures and of what is
subsequently done with the lawsuit, will be quite useful.
270. No less distinct, and no less important, is whether courts would in practice permit such
condemnations.
271. E.g., Blumenthal, supra note 262.
272. Of course, just compensation, as calculated by FMV, real option pricing, or asset theory
pricing, may be higher or lower than the actual expected damages. Such differences could lead to
strategic cost/benefit calculations for the efficiency of pursuing condemnation.
273. Conversely, it may encourage individuals to initiate litigation against government bodies
in the hopes of having the claim taken. Which of these occurs would be an empirical question;
the latter possibility might be addressed by data addressing whether settlement patterns by
government bodies influence the rate at which subsequent litigation is brought.
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